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Abstract	  	  The	   deployment	   of	   an	   Australian-­‐led	   peacekeeping	   force	   to	   East	   Timor	   in	  September	  1999	  was	  arguably	  the	  most	  significant	  strategic	  decision	  faced	  by	  an	  Australian	   government	   since	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   	   The	   operation	   posed	   a	  grave	   risk	   of	   military	   conflict	   with	   Indonesia,	   strained	   the	   Australia-­‐US	  relationship	  and	  redefined	  Asian	  perceptions	  of	  Australia.	  It	   is	   therefore	   important	   to	  examine	  how	  this	  scenario	  arose.	   	  Data	  obtained	   in	  thirteen	   interviews	   with	   key	   Australian	   decision-­‐makers	   has	   revealed	   new	  information	   about	   Australia’s	   strategic	   policy	   throughout	   1998-­‐1999.	   	   Despite	  having	   advocated	   an	   internal	   political	   settlement	   that	   would	   have	   legitimised	  Indonesia’s	  incorporation	  of	  East	  Timor,	  Australia	  accepted	  Indonesia’s	  decision	  to	  conduct	  a	  self-­‐determination	  ballot	  in	  East	  Timor	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli.	  	  From	  this	  point	   on	   Australia’s	   policy	   was	   largely	   reactive,	   working	   not	   to	   promote	   nor	  prevent	   independence	   but	   rather	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   ballot	   was	   credible	   and	  accompanied	  by	  minimal	  violence.	   	  These	  efforts	  had	   to	  be	  delicately	  balanced	  against	   Australia’s	   primary	   strategic	   objectives	   –	   Indonesia’s	   democratic	  progress	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	  Managing	   these	   conflicting	   objectives	   throughout	   1999	   was	   a	   significant	  challenge	   for	   Australia.	   	   Despite	   the	   severe	   violence	   that	   occurred	   after	   the	  ballot,	   Australia’s	   strategic	   policy	   was	   managed	   in	   an	   adroit	   manner	   that	  prioritised	   the	   most	   important	   objectives	   and	   avoided	   worst-­‐case	   outcomes.	  	  Given	  Australia’s	  limited	  strategic	  options	  throughout	  1998	  and	  1999,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  insignificant	  achievement.	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However	  glorious	  an	  action	   in	   itself,	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Introduction	  
This	   sub-­‐thesis	   examines	   Australia’s	   strategic	   policy	   towards	   the	   East	   Timor	  Issue	  from	  January	  1998	  until	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  International	  Force	  for	  East	  Timor	  (INTERFET)	   in	  September	  1999.	   	  By	  considering	   the	  “East	  Timor	   Issue”,	  this	  work	  goes	  beyond	   the	   status	  of	  East	  Timor	   to	   also	   consider	   the	  Australia-­‐Indonesia	   relationship	  and	   the	  nexus	  between	   this	   relationship	  and	  Australia’s	  strategic	  policy	  towards	  East	  Timor.	  	  It	  identifies,	  contextualises	  and	  analyses	  the	  influences	   on—and	   outcomes	   of—Australia’s	   strategic	   policy.	   	   For	   necessary	  reasons	  of	  brevity,	   this	  work	   is	  not	   a	   complete	  history	  of	  1998-­‐1999	  and	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  Indonesia’s	  approach	  to	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue,	  nor	  does	   it	  provide	  a	  detailed	  technical	  examination	  of	  policymaking	  processes	  in	  Australia.1	  	  This	  study	  focuses	  solely	  on	  strategic	  policy	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  the	  Australian	  Government.	  	  
Existing	  literature	  Unsurprisingly,	  a	  number	  of	  accounts	  of	  Australia’s	  approach	  to	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue	  have	  already	  been	  written.	  	  The	  boundaries	  of	  this	  literature	  are	  typified	  by	  two	   hypotheses:	   that	   Australia	   either	   deliberately	   worked	   to	   achieve	   East	  Timorese	  independence,	  or	  attempted	  to	  prevent	  independence	  by	  providing	  the	  Indonesian	   military	   an	   opportunity	   to	   subvert	   the	   act	   of	   self-­‐determination	  conducted	   in	   August	  1999.	   	   In	   March	   of	   the	   Patriots	   a	   prominent	   Australian	  journalist,	   Paul	   Kelly,	   suggests	   that	   Australia’s	   political	   leaders	   deliberately	  worked	  to	  achieve	  East	  Timorese	  independence2	  –	  something	  he	  has	  separately	  described	   as	   a	   ‘covert	   East	   Timor	   independence	   plan’.3	  	   The	   other	   position	   is	  explicated	   in	   ‘The	  Road	   to	   INTERFET:	  Bringing	   the	  Politics	  Back	   In’,	  by	  Clinton	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  an	  excellent	  analysis	  of	  the	  procedural	  aspects	  of	  Australian	  policymaking	  concerning	  East	  Timor,	   see	   Connery,	   David,	   Crisis	   Policymaking:	   Australia	   and	   the	   East	   Timor	   crisis	   of	   1999,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  ANU	  E	  Press,	  2010.	  2	  Kelly,	  Paul,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots	  –	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Modern	  Australia,	  Melbourne	  VIC:	  Melbourne	  University	  Press,	  2009.	  3	  Kelly,	  Paul,	  ‘John	  Howard's	  covert	  East	  Timor	  independence	  plan’,	  The	  Australian,	  05	  September	  2009.	  
	   2	  
Fernandes,	   a	   former	   Australian	   Army	   intelligence	   analyst.4 	  	   In	   this	   article,	  Fernandes	  argues	  that	  the	  Australian	  Government	  strived	  to	  ensure	  East	  Timor’s	  incorporation	  into	  Indonesia	  through	  deliberate	  inaction	  and	  a	  determination	  to	  avoid	  a	  peacekeeping	  force	  –	  until	  domestic	  political	  pressure	  forced	  their	  hands.	  	  	  Another	  account,	  ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET’	  by	  Hugh	  White,	  a	  former	  senior	  official	  in	   the	   Department	   of	   Defence,	   takes	   a	   middle	   path	   between	   these	   two	  narratives.5	  	  However,	  given	  the	  article’s	  authorship	  it	  considers	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue	  from	  a	  very	  Defence-­‐centric	  view,	  sometimes	  neglecting	  the	  perspectives	  of	  other	  Australian	  Government	  departments.	  	  	  
Methodology	  This	   sub-­‐thesis	   approaches	   the	  East	   Timor	   Issue	   from	  a	   historical	   perspective,	  providing	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  Australia’s	  strategic	  policy.	  	  Although	  this	  study	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  the	  official	  documents	  concerning	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue	  will	  only	  be	  declassified	  and	  released	  under	  the	  Archives	  Act	  in	  2020,	  two	   official	   publications	   sponsored	   by	   the	   Australian	   Government	   contain	   a	  number	  of	  complete	  primary	  sources,	  as	  well	  as	  numerous	  excerpts	  and	  quotes	  from	  official	  documents.6	  	  While	   the	   sub-­‐thesis	   draws	   extensively	   on	  publically	   available	   sources	   such	   as	  books,	   articles	   and	   media	   reports,	   it	   also	   uses	   data	   obtained	   in	   thirteen	  interviews	  with	  those	  intimately	  involved	  in	  forming	  Australian	  policy,	  including	  former	   Prime	   Minister	   John	   Howard	   and	   former	   Foreign	   Minister	   Alexander	  Downer.	  	  Several	  former	  senior	  public	  servants—as	  well	  as	  a	  former	  Ministerial	  Adviser	   and	   the	   then	   Chief	   of	   the	   Australian	   Defence	   Force—were	   also	  interviewed.	  	  These	  interviews	  provided	  perspectives	  and	  retrospectives	  that	  are	  very	  unlikely	  to	  be	  captured	  in	  official	  documentation	  and	  which	  might	  no	  longer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Fernandes,	  Clinton,	   ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET:	  Bringing	  the	  Politics	  Back	  In’,	  Security	  Challenges,	  4:3,	  Spring	  2008,	  pp.83-­‐98.	  5	  White,	  Hugh,	  ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET:	  Reflections	  on	  Australian	  Strategic	  Decisions	  Concerning	  East	  Timor,	  December	  1998-­‐September	  1999’,	  Security	  Challenges,	  4:1,	  Autumn	  2008,	  pp.	  69-­‐87.	  6	  	  Although	  recent	  changes	  to	  the	  Archives	  Act	  mean	  that	  the	  open	  access	  period	  will	  now	  begin	  in	  2020	   instead	  of	  2030,	   it	   remains	  possible	   that	  some	  documents—or	  parts	   thereof—will	  not	  be	  released	  due	  to	  concerns	  about	  national	  security	  and/or	  Australia’s	  diplomatic	  relationships.	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be	  available	  in	  2020.7	  	  With	  all	  interviews	  conducted	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2012,	  the	  events	  of	  1998-­‐1999	  were	  sufficiently	  distant	   to	  allow	  some	  retrospection,	  but	  not	   too	   far-­‐gone	   to	   prevent	   a	   reasonable	   degree	   of	   recollection.	   	   Through	   this	  research	  project	  a	  significant	  and	  contestable	  dataset	  was	  obtained.8	  	  	  Using	  this	  data,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  sources,	  this	  sub-­‐thesis	  examines:	  
• Australia’s	  strategic	  objectives	  throughout	  1998	  and	  1999,	  
• the	   change	   of	   Australia’s	   East	   Timor	   policy,	   communicated	   to	   the	  Indonesian	  President	  through	  the	  “Howard	  Letter”,	  
• Australia’s	  attempts	  to	  reduce	  violence	  in	  East	  Timor,	  
• Australia’s	  consideration	  of	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  peacekeeping	  force,	  and	  
• the	   assembly	   and	   deployment	   of	   a	   multi-­‐national	   peacekeeping	   force,	  including	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Australia-­‐US	  relationship.	  Each	  chapter	  of	  this	  study	  analyses	  a	  discrete	  chronological	  period,	  during	  which	  Australia’s	  strategic	  objectives—or	  the	  means	  used	  to	  pursue	  these	  objectives—changed	  in	  response	  to	  events	  in	  East	  Timor	  or	  Indonesia.	  	  	  This	  analysis	  shows	  that	  Australia’s	  strategic	  policy	  throughout	  this	  period	  was	  usually	   reactive,	   often	   driven	   by	   a	   desire	   to	   avoid	   certain	   scenarios.	   	   Most	  prominently,	   in	   January	   1999	   Indonesia	   decided	   to	   conduct	   an	   act	   of	   self-­‐determination	   for	   East	   Timor.	   	   This	   bold	   decision	   was	   quickly	   accepted	   by	  Australian	  decision	  makers	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli	  and	  this	  acquiescence	  established	  a	  rhythm	   of	   reactive	   Australian	   policy	   focussed	   on	  managing	   consequences	   and	  avoiding	  worst-­‐case	  outcomes.	  	  	  Throughout	   1999,	   violence	   in	   East	   Timor—in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   political	  situation	   in	   Indonesia—regularly	  placed	   the	  Australian	  Government	   in	  difficult	  diplomatic	  positions,	  with	   limited	  response	  options.	   	   In	  this	  context,	  Australia’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	   example,	   Ashton	   Calvert—who,	   as	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Department	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	  Trade,	  was	  a	  significant	  participant	  in	  forming	  Australia’s	  strategic	  policy—passed	  away	  in	  2007.	  	  	  8	  The	  author	  has	  approached	  the	  interview	  data	  carefully,	  with	  full	  cognisance	  of	  the	  perils	  of	  oral	  history.	   	   See,	   for	   example,	   Harrison,	   Brian,	   ‘Oral	   History	   and	   Recent	   Political	   History’,	   Oral	  
History,	  1:3,	  1972,	  pp.	  30-­‐48	  and	  Stille,	  Alexander,	  ‘Prospecting	  for	  Truth	  in	  the	  Ore	  of	  Memory’,	  
The	  New	  York	  Times,	  10	  March	   2001.	   	  Where	   possible,	   accounts	   have	   been	   corroborated	  with	  either	   primary	   sources	   or	   several	   interviewee	   perspectives.	   	   Where	   significant	   discrepancies	  exist,	  these	  have	  been	  noted.	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primary	   challenge	   throughout	   1999	   was	   ensuring	   that	   strategic	   policy	  appropriately	   prioritised	   the	   most	   important	   objectives	   –	   encouraging	  Indonesia’s	   developing	   democracy	   and	   maintaining	   the	   Australia-­‐Indonesia	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	  	  	  This	   account	   presents	   an	   original	   perspective	   on	   Australia’s	   strategic	   policy,	  based	  on	  new	  information	  sourced	  during	  a	  series	  of	  wide-­‐ranging	  interviews.	  	  It	  provides	   the	   “Whole	   of	   Government”	   aspect	   lacking	   in	   White’s	   article,	   while	  offering	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   grand	   and	  Machiavellian	   narratives	   of	   Kelly	   and	  Fernandes,	  respectively.	  	  It	  argues	  that	  a	  comprehensive	  but	  nuanced	  analysis	  of	  Australia’s	   objectives,	   decisions	   and	   actions	   throughout	   1998-­‐1999	  demonstrates	   that	  Australia’s	   strategic	   policy	  was	   usually	   reactive,	  with	   policy	  options	   constrained	   by	   the	   need	   to	   prioritise	   Australia’s	   most	   important	  objectives.	   	   Based	   on	   this	   assessment,	   the	   sub-­‐thesis	   closes	   with	   some	  conclusions	  about	  the	  efficacy	  of	  Australia’s	  strategic	  policy	  during	  this	  period.	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Chapter	  1	  
A	  search	  for	  stability	  as	  Suharto	  falls	  (January	  –	  June	  1998)	  
Background	  In	   1975,	   following	   the	   retreat	   of	   Portugal	   as	   the	   colonial	   power,	   Indonesian	  military	  forces	  invaded	  East	  Timor	  and	  the	  territory	  was	  formally	  incorporated	  into	   Indonesia	   in	   1976.	   	   Although	   Australia	   officially	   recognised	   Indonesia’s	  sovereignty	   over	   East	   Timor	   in	   1978,	   most	   of	   the	   international	   community	  regarded	  the	  occupation	  as	  illegal	  –	  only	  a	  small	  minority	  of	  nations	  recognised	  Indonesian	  rule,	  which	  was	  often	  violently	  enforced	  by	  the	  Indonesian	  military.9	  	  Despite	   domestic	   opposition	   to	   Australia’s	   position	   from	   human	   rights	   groups	  and	   the	   Catholic	   Church,	   Australia’s	   support	   for	   Indonesian	   sovereignty	   was	  maintained	  over	  many	  years	  and	  several	  changes	  of	  Government.	  	  In	   1998,	   the	   relationship	   with	   Indonesia	   was	   widely	   perceived	   to	   be	   one	   of	  Australia’s	  most	  important	  bilateral	  relationships.	  	  Partly	  because	  of	  its	  position	  as	   an	   archipelagic	   screen	   to	   the	   North	   of	   Australia,	   in	   1997	   Indonesia	   was	  officially	   described	   as	   a	   ‘key	   determinant	   of	   Australia’s	   security	   in	   the	   years	  ahead’.10	  	   Although	   Indonesia’s	   violent	   governance	   of	   East	   Timor	   was	   a	   long-­‐term	  irritant	  to	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  between	  Indonesia	  and	  Australia,	  both	  sides	  of	  Australian	  politics	  steadfastly	  supported	  Indonesian	  rule	  in	  East	  Timor,	  believing	   it	   to	   be	   a	   necessary	   cost	   of	   good	   relations	   with	   Jakarta.	   	   Australia’s	  then-­‐Prime	   Minister,	   John	   Howard,	   believed	   the	   ‘bipartisan	   constant	   was	   that	  nothing	   was	   to	   get	   in	   the	   way	   of	   smooth	   relations	   between	   Australia	   and	  Indonesia’.11	  	  	  	  
Australia’s	  national	  interest	  Accordingly,	   in	   early	   1998	   Australian	   strategic	   policy	   towards	   the	   East	   Timor	  Issue	  was	  focussed	  not	  on	  Dili,	  but	  Jakarta.	   	  Australia’s	  primary	  objectives	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  Edwards,	  Peter	  and	  Goldsworthy,	  David,	  Facing	  North:	  a	  century	  of	  Australian	  engagement	  
with	  Asia,	  Melbourne	  VIC:	  Melbourne	  University	  Press,	  2004,	  pp.216-­‐219.	  10 	  Commonwealth	   of	   Australia,	   Australia’s	   Strategic	   Policy,	   Canberra	   ACT:	   Department	   of	  Defence,	  1997,	  p.12.	  11	  Howard,	  John,	  Lazarus	  Rising,	  Sydney	  NSW:	  HarperCollins	  Publishers,	  2010,	  p,337.	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to	   support	   the	   stability	   of	   President	   Suharto’s	   regime	   and	   maintain	   good	  relations	  with	  Indonesia.	  	  Despite	  intervention	  from	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  in	  late	  1997,	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	  had	  led	  to	  a	  calamitous	  fiscal	  situation	   in	   Indonesia.	   	   Paul	  Wolfowitz,	   a	   former	  US	  Ambassador	   to	   Indonesia,	  later	  testified	  that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  was,	  for	  Indonesia,	  ‘probably	  as	  bad	  as	  the	  Great	  Depression	  was	  in	  the	  United	  States’.12	  	  In	   this	   context,	   with	   IMF	   funding	   critical	   to	   Indonesia’s	   stability,	   Australia	  contributed	  generously	  through	  both	  hard	  cash	  and	  a	   lobbying	  effort	   to	  ensure	  that	   the	   IMF—under	   US	   pressure—did	   not	   deal	   too	   harshly	   with	   Indonesia.13	  	  Howard’s	  International	  Adviser,	  Michael	  Thawley,	  described	  this	  assistance	  as	  a	  ‘very	   friendly	   gesture	   and	   one	   that	   showed	   we	   were	   serious	   about	   our	  commitment	   to	   the	   relationship	  with	   Indonesia’.14	  	   In	   the	   early	   stages	  of	  1998,	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue	  was	  not	  a	  primary	  concern	  for	  decision-­‐makers	  in	  Canberra	  –	  the	  Australian	  Government	  was	  focussed	  firmly	  on	  Jakarta	  and	  supporting	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  Suharto	  regime.	  
The	  Australian	  domestic	  angle	  The	   longstanding	   bipartisan	   consensus—that	   relations	   with	   Indonesia	   should	  take	   priority	   over	   any	   concerns	   for	   East	   Timor—was	   broken	   in	   late	   January	  1998,	   when	   the	   opposition	   Australian	   Labor	   Party	   (ALP)	   shifted	   its	   policy	   to	  claim	  that	  ‘no	  lasting	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict	  in	  East	  Timor	  is	  likely	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  negotiation	  through	  which	  the	  people	  of	  East	  Timor	  can	  exercise	  their	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination’. 15 	  	   This	   policy	   change	   may	   not	   have	   been,	   as	   Clinton	  Fernandes	   argues,	   ‘a	   critical	   factor	   in	   the	   independence	   of	   East	   Timor’,	   but	   it	  certainly	  did	  raise	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  Australia.16	  	  Australia’s	  acceptance	  of	  Indonesia’s	   occupation	   had	   always	   attracted	   strong	   domestic	   opposition	   –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Paul	  Wolfowitz,	  in	  testimony	  to	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific,	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  International	  Relations,	  US	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  04	  June	  1998,	  p.29.	  13	  See	  Howard,	  Lazarus	  Rising,	  p.339	  and	  Edwards	  and	  Goldsworthy,	  Facing	  North,	  pp.40-­‐43.	  14	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	  15	  Commonwealth	   of	   Australia,	  East	   Timor	   –	   Final	   Report	   of	   the	   Senate	   Foreign	  Affairs,	   Defence	  
and	  Trade	  References	  Committee,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Senate	  Printing	  Unit,	  2000,	  pp.174-­‐175.	  	  See	  also	  Dodson,	   Louise,	   ‘Brereton	   promises	   improved	   relations	   with	   European	   Union’,	   The	   Australian	  
Financial	  Review,	  23	  January	  1998.	  	  	  16	  Fernandes,	  Clinton,	  Reluctant	  Saviour	  -­‐	  Australia,	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Independence	  of	  East	  Timor,	  Melbourne	  VIC:	  Scribe	  Publications,	  2004,	  p.31.	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according	   to	   Australia’s	   then-­‐Foreign	  Minister,	   Alexander	   Downer,	   East	   Timor	  ‘plagued	   our	   relations	   with	   Indonesia	   and	   caused	   endless	   angst	   in	   the	  community’.17	  	   As	  media	   attention	   on	   the	   issue	   intensified	   throughout	   1998,	   it	  provided	  some	  domestic	  impetus	  for	  an	  Australian	  policy	  change.18	  	  	  
International	  influences	  on	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue	  Throughout	   this	   period	   the	   “Tripartite”	   talks	   between	   Portugal,	   Indonesia	   and	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  continued,	  with	  the	  UN	  representing	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  East	   Timorese.	   	   First	   convened	   in	   1983,	   the	   Tripartite	   talks	  were	   focussed	   on	  resolving	  the	  international	  status	  of	  East	  Timor	  –	  these	  negotiations	  had	  waxed	  and	  waned	  for	  years,	  producing	  few	  tangible	  results.	  	  Although	  some	  Indonesian	  officials	  were	   keen	   to	   achieve	   a	   compromise	   solution	   involving	   a	   level	   of	   East	  Timorese	  autonomy,	  Suharto	  was	  hostile	  to	  anything	  less	  than	  full	  integration.19	  	  	  	  As	  Indonesia’s	  financial	  situation	  worsened	  in	  the	  first	  few	  months	  of	  1998,	  the	  diplomatic	   talks	  were	  a	  sideshow	  compared	   to	   the	  growing	  social	   instability	   in	  Indonesia.	   	   Jamsheed	   Marker,	   the	   United	   Nations	   (UN)	   Secretary	   General’s	  Personal	  Representative	  for	  East	  Timor,	  commented	  that	  working	  on	  East	  Timor	  at	   this	   time	   seemed	   akin	   to	   ‘polishing	   the	   dinner	   silver	   on	   the	   Titanic’.20	  	  Australian	   officials	  were	   sceptical	   as	   to	   the	   value	   of	   the	   Tripartite	   talks:	   Hugh	  White,	  then	  a	  Deputy	  Secretary	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Defence,	  assessed	  them	  as	  ‘going	   through	   the	   motions’.21	  	   It	   was	   clear	   that	   under	   Suharto	   little	   progress	  could	   be	   achieved	   by	   the	   Tripartite	   process	   -­‐	   those	   ‘who	   believed	   a	   new	  approach	  was	   inevitable	  would	   have	   to	  wait	   for	   the	   ageing	   autocrat	   to	   finally	  depart	  the	  palace’.22	  	  Despite	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	   IMF,	   the	   financial	   crisis	   soon	   precipitated	   significant	  civil	  unrest	  in	  Indonesia.	  	  Protest	  action	  in	  Jakarta	  escalated	  and	  on	  12	  May	  1998,	  the	  shooting	  of	  four	  students	  protesting	  at	  Trisakti	  University	  was	  the	  beginning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Greenlees,	   Don	   and	   Garran,	   Robert,	   Deliverance:	   the	   inside	   story	   of	   East	   Timor’s	   fight	   for	  
freedom,	  Crows	  Nest	  NSW:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  2002,	  p.81.	  18	  Former	  Defence	  Minister	  John	  Moore,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  19	  See	  Greenlees	  and	  Garran,	  Deliverance,	  pp.28-­‐29.	  20	  Marker,	   Jamsheed,	  East	  Timor	  –	  A	  Memoir	  of	   the	  Negotiations	   for	   Independence,	   Jefferson	  NC:	  McFarland	  &	  Company,	  Inc.,	  Publishers,	  2003,	  p.79.	  21	  Hugh	  White,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  Several	  interviewees	  expressed	  similar	  sentiments.	  22	  Greenlees	  and	  Garran,	  Deliverance,	  p.30.	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of	   the	   end	   for	   Suharto.	   	   As	   he	   was	   overseas,	   it	   was	   left	   to	   Vice	   President	  Bacharuddin	  Jusuf	  (B.J.)	  Habibie	  and	  the	  Indonesian	  military	  (TNI)	  to	  handle	  the	  civil	  unrest.23	  	  By	  the	  time	  Suharto	  returned	  to	  Indonesia	  on	  15	  May,	  many	  of	  his	  Ministers	   had	   concluded	   that	   his	   continued	   rule	   was	   untenable	   –	   over	   1000	  people	  had	  died	   in	   riots	   and	  perhaps	  150	  000	   foreigners	  had	   fled	   Indonesia.24	  	  On	   21	   May	   1998,	   Suharto	   resigned	   and	   Habibie	   was	   sworn	   in	   as	   the	   third	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Indonesia.	  	  	  
Canberra	  reacts	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  Suharto	  Seen	   from	  Canberra,	   this	   transition	  was	  both	  exciting	  and	  worrying.	   	  Habibie’s	  Presidency	   offered	   opportunities	   for	   Indonesia	   –	   Thawley	   expressed	   a	   view	  shared	  by	  several	   interviewees;	   that	  Australia	  was	   focussed	  on	   ‘how	   Indonesia	  would	   change	   as	   a	   country	   and…the	   prospects	   of	   economic	   reform	   and	   more	  liberal	   politics’.25	  	   But	   there	   was	   also	   considerable	   apprehension	   and	   concern	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  TNI	  seizing	  control.	  	  White	  recalls	  that	  many	  intelligence	  assessments	  in	  this	  period	  were	  ‘really	  dark’.	  	  One	  feasible	  scenario	  was	  ‘a	  failed	  attempt	   to	   establish	  democracy	   and	   a	   reassertion	   of	   an	   authoritarian	  military-­‐backed	   Government,	   possibly	   with	   widespread	   bloodshed.	   	   This	   would	   be	   a	  Government	  with	  which	  we	  could	  not	  deal’.26	  As	   Habibie	   assumed	   the	   Presidency	   the	   Australian	   Government	   was	   firmly	  focussed	   on	  maintaining	   a	  workable	   relationship	  with	   Indonesia,	   regardless	   of	  who	  was	   in	  power.	   	   In	  mid-­‐May	  Howard	  reacted	   to	   the	  possibility	  of	  Suharto’s	  departure	  by	  declaring	  that	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  was	  ‘important	  beyond	  the	  tenure	  in	  office	  of	  any	  particular	  individuals’.27	  	  At	  this	  time,	  East	  Timor	  featured	  in	   Australia’s	   calculations	   only	   in	   relation	   to	   how	   it	  might	   hamper	   Indonesia’s	  democratisation	  and	  global	  standing	  –	  in	  late	  May	  Howard	  commented	  that	  East	  Timor	   ‘remains	   now	   a	  major	   irritant	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world,	   and	   legitimately	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Although	   the	   Indonesian	  military	  were	   known	   at	   this	   stage	   as	  Angkatan	  Bersenjata	  Republik	  
Indonesia	  (ABRI)	  –	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Indonesia,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  consistency	  the	  term	  Tentara	  Nasional	  Indonesia	  (TNI)	  –	  Indonesian	  National	  Armed	  Forces—which	  was	  adopted	  in	  1999—is	  used	  throughout	  this	  sub-­‐thesis.	  24 	  Commonwealth	   of	   Australia,	   East	   Timor	   in	   Transition	   1998-­‐2000:	   An	   Australian	   Policy	  
Challenge,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  2001,	  p.15.	  25	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	  26	  Hugh	  White,	  interview	  with	  author.	  27	  Barker,	  Geoffrey,	  ‘Australia	  bends	  to	  people	  power’,	  Australian	  Financial	  Review,	  16	  May	  1998.	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so’.28	  	  Asked	  if	  Australia	  should	  support	  self-­‐determination,	  Howard	  replied	  that	  ‘it	  would	  obviously	  be	  to	  the	  increased	  reputation	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  Government	  (and)	   it	   would	   obviously	   be	   well	   received	   if	   there	   were	   movements	   in	   that	  direction’.29	  	  Australia	  privately	  confirmed	  that	  these	  comments	  were	  not	  a	  shift	  of	  Australian	  policy	  and	  on	  02	   June	  1998,	  Habibie	  also	  signalled	   that	  he	  would	  not	  reconsider	  East	  Timor’s	  status.30	  	  	  
Habibie’s	  volte	  face	  –	  the	  offer	  of	  a	  “special	  status”	  Habibie—almost	   always	   described	   as	   mercurial—did	   not	   share	   Suharto’s	  immovable	   position	   on	   East	   Timor.	   	   In	   early	   June	   the	   Indonesian	   Foreign	  Minister,	  Ali	  Alatas,	  revived	  a	  plan	  presented	  to	  Suharto	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  	  This	  proposed	  Indonesia	  granting	  a	  “special	  status”	  to	  East	  Timor,	  providing	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  in	  exchange	  for	  international	  recognition	  of	  Indonesian	  sovereignty.	  	  Habibie	  and	  his	  Cabinet	  endorsed	   this	  proposal,	  perhaps	  because	   they	  were	  so	  preoccupied	  with	  financial	  and	  political	  matters	  ‘they	  did	  not	  give	  much	  thought	  to	   the	   East	   Timor	   question’.31	  	   Other	   scenarios—such	   as	   the	   possibility	   that	  Habibie	  might	  have	  seized	  an	  opportunity	  to	  wrest	  control	  of	  East	  Timor	  policy	  away	   from	   the	  TNI—hinted	  at	   the	  underlying	  civil-­‐military	   tensions	  within	   the	  Indonesian	  Government.32	  	  On	  09	  June	  1998,	  Habibie	  surprised	  the	  international	  community	   by	   announcing	   that	   he	   was	   willing	   to	   consider	   autonomy	   for	   East	  Timor	  in	  exchange	  for	  international	  recognition	  of	  Indonesian	  sovereignty.33	  	  	  	  Canberra’s	   reaction	   to	   Habibie’s	   announcement	   was	   cautiously	   positive,	  although	  wary	  about	  the	   lack	  of	  detail.	   	  Unofficially,	  many	  were	  concerned	  that	  Habibie’s	  action	  on	  East	  Timor	  could	  irritate	  the	  TNI	  leadership	  and	  increase	  the	  risk	   of	   a	  military	   coup.	   	   Peter	   Varghese,	   a	   senior	   official	   in	   the	  Department	   of	  Prime	   Minister	   and	   Cabinet	   (PM&C),	   later	   noted	   that	   this	   ‘was	   a	   potentially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Dow	  Jones	  Newswires,	  ‘Australia	  Urges	  Indonesia	  Habibie	  to	  End	  East	  Timor	  Dispute’,	  25	  May	  1998.	  29	  See	  Greene,	  Gervase,	  ‘Howard	  in	  Freedom	  Call	  on	  East	  Timor’,	  The	  Age,	  26	  May	  1998.	  30	  See	  Reuters	  News,	  ‘Indonesia’s	  Habibie	  says	  no	  change	  in	  Timor	  policy’,	  02	  June	  1998.	  See	  also	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.35	  for	  Australian	  assurances	  that	  Howard’s	  comments	  were	  not	  a	  policy	  shift.	  	  	  31	  Alatas,	   Ali,	   The	   Pebble	   in	   the	   Shoe:	   the	   Diplomatic	   Struggle	   for	   East	   Timor,	   Jakarta:	   Aksara	  Karunia,	  2006,	  p.135.	  32	  See	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  pp.37-­‐38.	  33	  See	  Greenlees,	  Donald,	  ‘Amnesty	  not	  enough	  for	  Dili’,	  The	  Australian,	  11	  June	  1998.	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dangerous	   transition	  period	  and	  of	   course	  Habibie	  didn’t	   inspire	   confidence	   at	  the	  time’.34	  	  The	  spectre	  of	  Indonesia’s	  military	  history	  also	  hung	  over	  Habibie	  –	  White	   notes	   that	   ‘we	  were	   surprised	   that	   he	   ran	   with	   it	   so	   hard,	   so	   early.	   	   It	  seemed	   to	   us	   very	   likely	   as	   something	   that	   would	   really	   irritate	   TNI’.35	  	   For	  Thawley,	  the	  key	  question	  was	  ‘could	  Habibie	  actually	  deliver	  it?	   	  We	  tended	  to	  think	   of	   him	   as	   someone	   who	   said	   lots	   of	   things,	   had	   lots	   of	   good	   ideas,	   but	  wasn’t	  able	  to	  deliver	  them	  –	  his	  policy	  freedom	  was	  very	  constrained’.36	  	  	  
Australia	  takes	  an	  interest	  Against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   economic	   hardship	   and	   civil-­‐military	   tension	   the	  Australian	  Government	  considered	  East	  Timor	  to	  be	  a	  secondary	  concern,	  but	  it	  was	  acknowledged	  that	  Habibie’s	  Presidency	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  address	  an	   issue	  that	  had	   long	  plagued	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  and	  adversely	  affected	  Indonesia’s	  international	  standing.	  	  Varghese	  notes	  this	  view	  was	  most	  prevalent	  in	   the	   Department	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Trade	   (DFAT)	   -­‐	   the	   ‘departure	   of	  Suharto	  and	  the	  coming	  in	  of	  the	  new	  regime	  were	  seen	  by	  some,	  particularly	  in	  DFAT,	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  get	  this	  monkey	  off	  our	  back’.37	  	  Though	  regarded	  as	  of	  lesser	  importance	  than	  the	  need	  for	  political	  and	  economic	  reform,	  there	  was	  a	   feeling	   that	   Indonesia’s	  movement	   towards	   a	   “special	   status”	   for	   East	   Timor	  meant	   continued	   inaction	   by	   Australia	   was	   not	   feasible.38	  	   Politically,	   Howard	  also	   felt	   the	  need	  to	  act	  –	   there	  was	  concern	  that	  with	  Habibie	  moving	  on	  East	  Timor,	  Australia	  could	  be	  ‘left	  behind’.39	  	  	  	  	  	  Habibie’s	   announcement	  had	   reinvigorated	   the	  Tripartite	  process,	  with	   the	  UN	  continuing	  to	  represent	  the	  East	  Timorese.	  	  However,	  the	  Portuguese	  cleaved	  to	  their	   longstanding	   position	   that	   they	   would	   not	   ‘acknowledge	   publicly	   and	   in	  advance	  Indonesia’s	  sovereignty	  over	  East	  Timor	  or	  that	  the	  integration	  of	  East	  Timor	   with	   Indonesia	   was	   final’.40	  	   This	   position	   clashed	   with	   Habibie’s	   offer,	  which	   imagined	   autonomy	   as	   the	   quid	   pro	   quo	   for	   international	   recognition.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Peter	  Varghese,	  interview	  with	  author.	  35	  Hugh	  White,	  interview	  with	  author.	  36	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	  37	  Peter	  Varghese,	  interview	  with	  author.	  38	  See	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	  p.486.	  39	  John	  Howard,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  40	  Alatas,	  The	  Pebble	  in	  the	  Shoe,	  p.137.	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Sceptical	  about	  the	  Tripartite	  process	  but	  cognisant	  of	  the	  potential	  presented	  by	  Habibie’s	  offer,	  DFAT	  came	  to	  the	  view	  that	  the:	  
only	   chance	   for	   a	   lasting	   resolution	   of	   the	  East	   Timor	  problem	  will	   come	  about	  through	  a	  process	  of	  negotiation	  between	  the	  central	  government	  in	  Jakarta	  and	  the	  recognised	  representatives	  of	  the	  East	  Timorese	  people….if	  the	  Indonesians	  showed	  readiness	  to	  accept	  this	  approach,	  Australia	  might	  be	  able	  to	  facilitate	  the	  process.41	  
A	  new	  objective	  for	  Australia	  In	  late	  June	  1998,	  Australia’s	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Alexander	  Downer,	  announced	  he	  would	  travel	  to	  Jakarta	  in	  early	  July.	  	  His	  media	  release	  prominently	  highlighted	  how	   Australia	   sought	   to	   work	   with	   Indonesia	   to	   ‘implement	   political	   and	  economic	   reform…in	   order	   to	   rebuild	   international	   confidence	   in	   Indonesia’.	  	  Only	   one	   sentence	   commented	   on	   ‘the	   delicate	   issue	   of	   East	   Timor’	   and	  ‘Australia’s	   deep	   interest	   in	   seeing	   this	   problem	   taken	   forward’.42	  	   However,	  DFAT’s	  work	  had	  prepared	  a	   low-­‐risk	  option	  –	  Downer	  could	  suggest	   to	  Alatas	  that	   Australia	   conduct	   a	   survey	   of	   East	   Timorese	   leaders,	   evaluating	   their	  responses	  to	  Habibie’s	  offer.43	  	  	  Downer	   left	   for	   Jakarta	   with	   an	   agenda	   that	   reflected	   Australia’s	   strategic	  objectives	  at	   that	   time	  –	  economic	  security	  was	   the	  primary	  concern,	  as	   it	  was	  considered	   the	   sine	   qua	   non	   of	   political	   stability,	   democratisation	   and	   further	  civil-­‐military	   reform.	   	   Australian	   support	   would	   also	   affirm	   the	   importance	   of	  maintaining	  and	  strengthening	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  between	  Australia	  and	  the	   new,	   democratic	   Indonesia	   –	   these	   objectives	   were	   the	   top	   priorities.	  	  However,	  Habibie’s	  offer	  of	  a	  special	  status	  created	  both	  the	  room	  to	  move	  and	  the	  impetus	  for	  a	  change	  of	  Australia’s	  East	  Timor	  policy.	  	  Although	  it	  was	  not	  a	  primary	   objective,	   Australia	   was	   now	   concerned	   with	   ‘persuading	   the	  Indonesians	  to	  include	  the	  East	  Timorese’	  in	  their	  considerations	  of	  autonomy.44	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41 	  Diplomatic	   cable	   from	   Canberra	   to	   Jakarta,	   23	   June	   1998,	   as	   quoted	   in	   Edwards	   and	  Goldsworthy,	  Facing	  North,	  p.225.	  42	  Downer,	  Alexander,	  Media	  Release	  –	  Visit	  to	  Jakarta,	  Indonesia,	  30	  June	  1998.	  43	  See	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  pp.81-­‐82.	  	  See	  also	  Edwards	  and	  Goldsworthy,	  Facing	  North,	  p.224.	  44	  Howard,	  Lazarus	  Rising,	  p.340.	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Chapter	  2	  
Challenges	  and	  opportunities	  for	  Australia	  (July	  –	  November	  1998)	  
Downer’s	  approach	  to	  Alatas	  Downer	  visited	  Jakarta	  from	  08-­‐10	  July	  1998,	  meeting	  with	  Habibie,	  Alatas	  and	  the	  Defence	  Minister,	  General	  Wiranto.	  	  There	  are	  few	  accounts	  of	  his	  discussions	  with	   Indonesian	   leaders,	   but	   the	   two	   official	   publications	   concerning	   the	   East	  Timor	   Issue	   note	   that	   it	   was	   discussed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Indonesia’s	   global	  standing	   –	   ‘the	   East	   Timor	   problem	   was	   harming	   Indonesia’s	   international	  reputation,	   at	   a	   time	   when	   Indonesia	   needed	   all	   the	   international	   support	   it	  could	   get’.45 	  	   In	   a	   meeting	   with	   Alatas,	   Downer	   offered	   Australia’s	   help	   in	  surveying	   the	   opinion	   of	   influential	   East	   Timorese	   leaders,	   in	   order	   to	   discern	  their	  views	  on	  Habibie’s	  “special	  status”	  proposal.	   	  According	  to	  John	  McCarthy,	  then	   Australia’s	   Ambassador	   to	   Indonesia,	   Alatas	   ‘wasn’t	   at	   all	   keen,	   but	  eventually	  gave	  his	  consent’.46	  	  	  Downer’s	   public	   comments	   during	   the	   visit	   were	   circumspect,	   affirming	  Australia’s	  long-­‐standing	  support	  for	  East	  Timor’s	  integration	  into	  Indonesia	  but	  noting	   that	   Australia	   ‘would	   like	   to	   see	   an	   early	   reduction	   in	   the	   military	  presence,	  a	  dramatic	  improvement	  in	  human	  rights,	  and	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  East	  Timorese	  people	  manage	  their	  own	  internal	  affairs’.47	  	  He	  downplayed	  the	  prospects	  for	  rapid	  progress	  in	  East	  Timor,	  saying	  ‘it	  is	  obviously	  a	  very	  divided	  place.	  	  There	  is	  no	  point	  trying	  to	  resolve	  the	  issue	  with	  a	  quick	  fix’.48	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  survey	  of	  East	  Timorese	  opinion	  	  	  	  	  On	  his	  return,	  Downer	  authorised	  DFAT	  to	  conduct	  the	  survey	  of	  East	  Timorese	  opinion.	   	   In	   this,	   Downer	   was	   seeking	   ‘an	   answer	   to	   a	   proposition	   the	  Indonesians	   couldn’t	   answer’	   –	   whether	   the	   East	   Timorese	   would	   support	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Edwards	  and	  Goldsworthy,	  Facing	  North,	  p.225.	  See	  also	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.25.	  46	  John	  McCarthy,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  47 	  Downer,	   Alexander,	   A	   Long	   Term	   Commitment:	   Australia	   and	   East	   Asia,	   Speech	   to	   the	  Indonesian	  Council	  on	  World	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Indonesia-­‐Australia	  Business	  Council,	  09	  July	  1998.	  48	  Williams,	  Louise,	  ‘Military	  Ties	  Help,	  Downer	  Insists’,	  The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  10	  July	  1998.	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Habibie’s	  offer.49	  	  The	  survey	  revealed	  only	  limited	  enthusiasm	  for	  Habibie’s	  plan	  and	  little	  support	  for	  either	  immediate	  independence	  or	  an	  immediate	  act	  of	  self-­‐determination.	   	  However,	   ‘almost	  all	  argued	  that	  any	  plan	  for	  autonomy	  should	  be	  put	  to	  the	  people	  for	  decision’.50	  	  The	  formal	  report	  noted	  a	  majority	  view	  in	  favour	  of	  ‘a	  transitional	  autonomy	  arrangement,	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  referendum	  or	   similar	   process	   after	   a	   specified	   period	  which	   varied	   from	   3	   to	   20	   years’.51	  	  Significantly,	   the	   report	   noted	   that	   Habibie’s	   offer	   of	   special	   autonomy	   had	  ‘hardened’	   positions	   in	   East	   Timor,	  with	   ‘some	   formerly	  moderate	   voices	   now	  demanding	  a	  referendum’.52	  	  	  	  Downer	   sent	   the	   report	   to	   Alatas	   in	   August	   1998,	   suggesting	   that	   ‘negotiation	  with	  the	  East	  Timorese	  provides	  Indonesia	  with	  the	  best	  chance	  it	  has	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise’.53	  	  Alatas	  viewed	  the	  report	  as	  biased	  –	  although	  he	  shared	  it	  with	  Habibie	  and	  other	  Indonesian	  ministers,	  they	  too	  ‘did	  not	  give	  it	  much	  credence’	  and	  it	  was	  ‘in	  effect	  set	  aside’.54	  	  Alatas’	  inaction	  reaffirmed	  to	  Australian	  officials	  that	  he	  was	  part	  of	   the	  problem	  –	   reluctant	   to	  negotiate	  directly	  with	   the	  East	  Timorese,	  he	  saw	  East	  Timor	  as	  an	  international	  diplomatic	  matter	  rather	  than	  a	  domestic	   one.	   	   Australia	   officials	   realised	   that	   in	   order	   to	   ameliorate	   the	  international	   dimensions	   of	   the	   East	   Timor	   Issue,	   ‘carriage	   has	   to	   shift	   from	  Alatas	  to	  Habibie	  and	  TNI’.55	  	  	  Interviewed	   by	   Paul	   Kelly	   in	   2006,	   Downer	   claimed	   that	   the	   survey	   had	   a	  particularly	   strong	   impact	   on	   his	   understanding	   of	   East	   Timor	   –	   “I	   said	   to	  my	  department	  after	  the	  survey	  results	  that	  ‘much	  as	  you	  may	  not	  like	  this,	  one	  day	  that	   place	   will	   be	   independent.’” 56 	  	   While	   Downer’s	   remark	   remains	  uncorroborated,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   survey	   would	   have	   influenced	   Australian	  decision-­‐makers.	   	   Given	   the	   sensitivities	   associated	  with	   the	   East	   Timor	   Issue,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Alexander	  Downer,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  50	  Edwards	  and	  Goldsworthy,	  Facing	  North,	  p.226.	  51	  See	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.177.	  	  Although	  the	  formal	  survey	  report	  has	  been	  released	  in	   this	   official	   publication,	   raw	  data	   concerning	   the	   consultation	   of	   East	   Timorese	   figures	  may	  become	  available	  in	  2020.	   	  Though	  only	  this	  data	  will	  enable	  the	  survey	  findings	  to	  be	  critically	  assessed,	  they	  are	  generally	  corroborated	  by	  other	  sources	  –	  e.g.	  see	  Marker,	  East	  Timor,	  p.109.	  52	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.178.	  53	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.180.	  	  	  54	  Alatas,	  The	  Pebble	  in	  the	  Shoe,	  p.143.	  55	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  56	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	  p.486.	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this	   survey	   initiated	   ‘the	   first	   comprehensive	  meetings	  of	  Australian	  diplomats	  with	  East	  Timorese	   in	  23	  years’.57	  	  According	   to	  McCarthy,	   the	   survey	   ‘showed	  we	  were	  thinking	  along	  a	  more	  progressive	  line…it	  probably	  laid	  the	  intellectual	  groundwork	   for	   the	   Howard	   Letter’. 58 	  	   Downer	   supported	   this	   sentiment,	  regarding	  the	  survey	  results	  as	  ‘the	  genesis’	  of	  the	  letter.59	  	  Although	   the	   primary	   motivations	   for	   the	   DFAT	   survey	   were	   to	   ascertain	   the	  Timorese	   view	   towards	   Habibie’s	   offer	   and	   encourage	   Indonesia	   to	   negotiate	  directly	  with	  the	  East	  Timorese,	  the	  opportunity	  for	  domestic	  political	  gain	  was	  also	   recognised.	   	   Shortly	   after	   his	   visit	   to	   Jakarta,	   Downer	   revealed	   to	   the	  Australian	  media	  that	  DFAT	  officials	  would	  be	  consulting	  directly	  with	  the	  East	  Timorese	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   23	   years.60	  	   Former	   officials	   commented	   that	   in	  doing	   so,	   Downer	  might	   have	   been	   seeking	   to	   differentiate	   his	   approach	  with	  that	  of	  his	  ALP	  predecessor,	  Gareth	  Evans.61	  	  
Violence	  in	  East	  Timor	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  Tripartite	  talks	  In	  mid-­‐July,	   Jamsheed	  Marker	  arrived	   in	   Jakarta	  with	   the	   intent	  of	  visiting	  Dili.	  	  However,	  the	  security	  situation	  in	  East	  Timor	  had	  worsened	  since	  Habibie’s	  offer	  of	  special	  autonomy:	  during	  a	  visit	  by	  three	  European	  Union	  Ambassadors	  in	  late	  June,	  conflict	  between	  pro-­‐independence	  and	  pro-­‐integration	  groups	  resulted	  in	  casualties,	  as	  the	  Ambassadors	  were	  whisked	  away	  in	  a	  military	  helicopter.62	  	  As	  observed	  in	  the	  DFAT	  survey,	  Habibie’s	  offer	  of	  a	  special	  status	  had	  emboldened	  the	  East	  Timorese	  –	  Marker’s	  aide	  reported	  that	  many	  East	  Timorese	  ‘see	  in	  the	  present	  situation	  a	  door	  that	  has	  cracked	  ajar	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  pushed	  open	  for	  a	  rapid	  exit	  before	  it	  closes	  again’.63	  	  	  Probably	   cognisant	   of	   the	   international	   focus	   on	   Timor	   and	   the	   potential	   for	  violence,	   in	   late	   June	   Habibie	   had	   directed	   the	   TNI	   to	   reduce	   their	   military	  presence.	   	  On	  28	   July,	  with	  much	  fanfare,	  some	  TNI	  troops	  withdrew	  from	  Dili.	  	  Later,	   it	   emerged	   that	   this	   movement	   was	   a	   ruse	   –	   these	   troops	   had	   been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.82.	  58	  John	  McCarthy,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  59	  Alexander	  Downer,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  60	  Murdoch,	  Lindsay,	  ‘Australia	  in	  Secret	  E	  Timor	  Peace	  Role’,	  The	  Age,	  18	  July	  1998.	  61	  Two	  former	  Australian	  Government	  officials,	  interviews	  with	  the	  author.	  62	  Marker,	  East	  Timor,	  p.92.	  63	  Marker,	  East	  Timor,	  p.109.	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redeployed	   elsewhere	   in	   East	   Timor.64	  	   Another	   incident	   soon	   threatened	   to	  derail	   the	  Tripartite	   talks	   -­‐	   in	  mid-­‐November	  reports	  of	  a	  massacre	   in	   the	  East	  Timorese	   town	   of	   Alas	   emerged	   and	   in	   response,	   Portugal	   suspended	   their	  participation	  in	  the	  Tripartite	  process.65	  	  	  Although	   it	   was	   eventually	   established	   that	   reports	   of	   a	   massacre	   were	  exaggerated,	  developments	  such	  as	  Portugal’s	  reaction	  probably	  encouraged	  the	  Australian	   Government’s	   scepticism	   towards	   the	   Tripartite	   talks.	   	   Downer,	   in	  particular,	   was	   contemptuous	   –	   believing	   them	   to	   be	   ‘the	   triumph	   of	   process	  over	  reality’,	  he	  ‘never	  thought	  it	  was	  important	  in	  terms	  of	  outcomes’.66	  	  Though	  the	  Tripartite	  process	  would	  eventually	  determine	  the	  security	  arrangements	  for	  the	   self-­‐determination	  ballot,	   for	  now	  many	  believed	   that	   these	   talks	  were	  not	  yielding	  results.	   	  Worse	  still,	   they	  were	  drawing	   further	   international	  attention	  to	  East	  Timor:	  ‘affecting	  the	  attitude	  of	  donors	  and	  hampering	  Indonesia’s	  efforts	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  international	  community’.67	  	  
Australia’s	  strategic	  objectives	  in	  November	  1998	  From	  July-­‐November	  1998,	  Australia	  lobbied	  Indonesia	  to	  negotiate	  directly	  with	  the	  East	  Timorese.	  	  Australia’s	  main	  effort—the	  survey	  of	  East	  Timorese	  opinion	  and	  its	  presentation	  to	  Alatas—was	  essentially	  ignored.	  	  Australian	  officials	  now	  viewed	  Alatas’	  determination	   to	  negotiate	  with	   the	  UN,	   as	  opposed	   to	   the	  East	  Timorese,	   as	   part	   of	   the	   problem.	   	   Thawley	   noted	   that	   ‘Alatas	   simply	   couldn’t	  deliver	   –	   he	   had	   no	   clout	   in	   the	   system’.68	  	   Insomuch	   as	   they	   brought	   further	  international	  attention	  on	  to	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue,	  Alatas’	  diplomatic	  efforts	  were	  actually	   working	   against	   Australia’s	   primary	   strategic	   goals	   –	   consolidation	   of	  democracy	   in	   Indonesia	   and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   the	   bilateral	   relationship.	  	  Rebuffed	   by	   Alatas,	   Australia	   would	   now	   turn	   to	   Habibie	   in	   pursuit	   of	   its	  strategic	  objectives	  concerning	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  See	  Williams,	  Louise,	  ‘Downer	  Concerned	  At	  Timor	  Moves’,	  The	  Age,	  19	  October	  1998.	  65	  Marker,	  East	  Timor,	  p.106.	  	  	  66	  Alexander	  Downer,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  67	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  In	  interviews	  with	  the	  author,	  John	  Howard	  and	  John	  Moore	  both	  noted	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  East	  Timor	  on	  Indonesia’s	   international	  reputation	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  attract	  international	  investment	  were	  significant	  concerns	  in	  late	  1998.	  	  68	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	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Chapter	  3	  
The	  “Howard	  Letter”	  (November-­‐December	  1998)	  
Australia	  decides	  to	  change	  tack	  on	  East	  Timor	  On	   30	  November	   1998,	   Ashton	   Calvert,	   the	   Secretary	   of	   DFAT,	   sent	   Downer	   a	  note	  with	  a	  draft	   letter,	   from	  Howard	   to	  Habibie,	  attached.	   	  The	   full	   text	  of	   the	  letter	  and	  Calvert’s	  covering	  note	  are	  not	  publically	  available,	  but	  are	  quoted	  in	  
March	   of	   the	   Patriots	   by	   Paul	   Kelly.	   	   Calvert	   described	   the	   letter	   as	  recommending	  to	  Habibie	  that	  after	  a	  lengthy	  period	  of	  autonomy,	  ‘an	  act	  of	  self-­‐determination	  [be]	  held	  at	  some	  reasonably	  distant	  point	  in	  the	  future’.69	  	  	  	  Two	  days	  later,	  at	  a	  National	  Security	  Committee	  of	  Cabinet	  (NSCC)	  meeting	  on	  01	   December,	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   policy	   change	   on	   East	   Timor	   was	   discussed.70	  	  Although	  there	  are	  conflicting	  accounts	  of	  how	  this	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  NSCC,	  it	  seems	   likely	   that	   Downer	  made	   an	   oral	   presentation	   to	   the	   committee,	   which	  then	   agreed	   that	   Australia	   would	   change	   its	   policy	   on	   East	   Timor.	   	   Australia	  would	  support	  an	  act	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  but	  one	  conducted	  after	  a	  substantial	  interregnum	  of	   autonomy.71	  	   Defence	   officials	  were	   unaware	   that	  work	  was	   to	  immediately	   begin	   on	   the	   policy	   shift	   –	   they	   only	   learnt	   of	   the	   letter	   in	   late	  December,	  after	  it	  had	  been	  sent.	  	  	  The	  letter,	  which	  was	  drafted	  by	  Thawley,	  Varghese	  and	  the	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  DFAT,	   John	   Dauth,	   emphasised	   that	   ‘Australia’s	   support	   for	   Indonesia’s	  sovereignty	   is	   unchanged’	   –	   it	   explicitly	   noted	   that	   ‘the	   interests	   of	   Australia,	  Indonesia	   and	   East	   Timor	   are	   best	   served	   by	   East	   Timor	   remaining	   part	   of	  Indonesia’.72	  	   It	   downplayed	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   UN-­‐sponsored	   Tripartite	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	  p.487.	  70	  John	  Howard,	   Alexander	  Downer,	   John	  Moore,	   Tim	  Fischer,	   interviews	  with	   author.	   See	   also	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  pp.85-­‐86.	  	  71	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.86.	  	  Cf.	  Connery,	  Crisis	  Policymaking,	  p.22.	  	  There	  remains	  significant	   debate	   about	   whether	   the	   NSCC	   agreed	   that	   there	   would	   be	   a	   policy	   change,	   or	  whether	  it	  went	  beyond	  this	  and	  agreed	  that	  the	  policy	  change	  would	  occur	  through	  a	  letter	  from	  Howard	  to	  Habibie.	  	  John	  Moore,	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  author,	  explained	  that	  he	  expected	  the	  NSCC	  to	  discuss	  the	  matter	  again	  before	  any	  policy	  shift	  occurred.	  	  These	  discrepancies	  will	  likely	  remain	  unresolved	  until	  the	  relevant	  Cabinet	  records	  are	  released	  in	  2029.	  	  	  	  	  72	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.181.	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talks,	   noting	   that	   ‘the	   UN	   process	   is	   not	   producing	   the	   desired	   results	   quickly	  enough’	  –	  Howard	  also	  suggested	  that	  if	  an	  agreement	  could	  be	  reached	  directly	  with	   the	  East	   Timorese,	   then	   ‘the	   international	   dimensions	  would	   take	   care	   of	  themselves’.73	  	  The	  letter	  concluded	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Matignon	  Accords—a	  mechanism	  through	  which	  France	  deferred	   ‘a	  referendum	  on	  the	  final	  status	  of	  New	  Caledonia	  for	  many	  years’—might	  offer	  an	  example	  of	  how	  Indonesia	  could	  resolve	  the	  problem	  of	  East	  Timor’s	  international	  status.74	  	  	  Relatively	   few	  officials	  knew	  about	   the	   letter	  and	  within	  even	  this	  group,	   there	  were	  mixed	  feelings	  about	  what	  the	  letter	  should	  say	  and	  imply.75	  	  Opinion	  was	  divided	   as	   to	   whether	   there	   should	   be	   an	   explicit	   reference	   to	   the	   Matignon	  Accords,	   with	   some	   voicing	   concern	   that	   Habibie	   might	   take	   offence	   to	   the	  comparison.	  	  Recognising	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  letter	  and	  the	  need	  to	  anticipate	  Habibie’s	  mercurial	  character,	  Thawley	  asked	  an	  intelligence	  analyst	  at	  the	  Office	  of	  National	  Assessments	  to	  review	  the	  letter.	  	  Their	  task	  was	  not	  to	  offer	  drafting	  suggestions	  but	  to	  advise	  ‘how	  an	  Indonesian	  would	  read	  the	  letter’.76	  	  The	  text	  of	  the	  letter	  corroborates	  Thawley’s	  claim	  that	  it	  was	  designed	  ‘to	  make	  Habibie	  feel	  that	  the	  options	  were	  open	  –	  that	  something	  had	  to	  be	  done,	  but	  what	  wasn’t	  necessarily	  laid	  down’.77	  	  	  
The	  intent	  of	  the	  letter	  Four	   factors	  motivated	   Australia	   to	   dispatch	   the	  Howard	   Letter.	   	   The	   primary	  concern	  was	   to	   convince	   Habibie	   that	   despite	   his	   offer	   of	   a	   “special	   status”	   in	  June,	  a	  fresh	  approach	  was	  needed.	  	  Although	  Howard	  claims	  the	  ‘purpose	  of	  the	  letter	   was	   not	   to	   help	   Indonesia	   retain	   sovereignty	   over	   East	   Timor’,	   many	  officials	  had	  other	   ideas.78	  	  Dauth	   later	  explained	  that	   ‘a	  very	   important	  part	  of	  our	   thinking	  at	   the	   time	   that	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  dispatched	  his	   letter	  was	   that	  Indonesia	   really	   had	   only	   one	   last	   chance	   to	   keep	   East	   Timor	   as	   part	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.181.	  74	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.182.	  75	  Michael	  Thawley,	  Peter	  Varghese,	  John	  Dauth,	  interviews	  with	  author.	  	  76	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  See	  also	  Connery,	  Crisis	  Policymaking,	  p.21.	  77	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  See	  also	  text	  of	  the	  Howard	  Letter	  in	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  
in	  Transition,	  pp.181-­‐182.	  78	  John	  Howard,	  interview	  with	  author.	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Indonesia’.79	  	  It	  was	  hoped	  that	  Howard’s	  suggestion—a	  long	  period	  of	  autonomy	  followed	   by	   an	   act	   of	   self-­‐determination—would	   maximise	   the	   chance	   of	  Indonesia	  legitimising	  its	  incorporation	  of	  East	  Timor.	  	  Calvert	  believed	  the	  letter	  ‘was	  designed	  as	  a	  warning	  to	  Indonesia	  and	  to	  encourage	  it	  to	  make	  a	  far	  better	  effort	  on	  East	  Timor’.80	  	  This	  was	  the	  primary	  thrust	  and	  main	  effort	  of	  the	  letter	  –	  Indonesia	  had	  to	  move	  quickly	  on	  Timor	  to	  prevent	  the	   issue	  from	  escalating	  further,	  possibly	  beyond	  Jakarta’s	  control.	  	  Clearly,	  these	  officials	  did	  not	  intend	  for	  the	  letter	  to	  prod	  Habibie	  along	  the	  path	  towards	  East	  Timorese	   independence.	   	  Varghese	   later	   commented	   that	   ‘people	  who	  see	   the	  Howard	  Letter	   as	   a	  historic	   shift	  have	  never	  actually	   read	  what	   it	  says:	   it	   goes	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	   say	   to	   Habibie	   “we	   are	   not	   supporting	  independence”’.81	  	  This	  view	  was	  also	  supported	  by	  Dauth,	  who	  noted	  that	  ‘what	  we	  were	  advocating	  in	  the	  Howard	  Letter…was	  a	  greater	  measure	  of	  autonomy	  for	  East	  Timor,	  but	  not	  independence’.82	  	  Secondly,	   the	   letter	   reflected	  Australia’s	   belief	   that	   Alatas’	   carriage	   of	   the	   East	  Timor	   Issue	  was	  aggravating	   the	   international	   aspects	  of	   the	  problem,	  without	  progressing	   towards	   a	   long-­‐term,	   substantive	   result.	   	   Downer	   had	   encouraged	  Alatas	   to	   negotiate	   directly	   with	   the	   East	   Timorese	   to	   no	   effect	   and	   with	  Portugal’s	   suspension	   of	   the	   Tripartite	   talks,	   Australian	   officials	   were	   deeply	  sceptical	  that	  the	  process	  could	  deliver	  results.	  	  Varghese	  recalled	  that	  ‘our	  view	  at	  the	  time	  was	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  particularly	  significant	  process	  and	  was	  unlikely	  to	   result	   in	   anything	   that	   would	   be	   good	   for	   us’.83	  	   These	   sentiments	   are	  supported	   by	   Thawley,	   who	   said	   that	   ‘the	   more	   Australia	   did	   to	   move	   these	  diplomatic	  talks	  along,	  the	  more	  irritated	  we	  were	  likely	  to	  make	  the	  Indonesian	  leadership,	  without	  making	  any	  serious	  progress	  on	  the	  issue’.84	  	  By	  elevating	  the	  matter	  through	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  President,	  Australian	  officials	  hoped	  that	  Habibie’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Commonwealth	   of	   Australia,	   Official	   Committee	   Hansard,	   References	   Committee:	   Economic,	  social	  and	  political	  conditions	  in	  East	  Timor,	  06	  December	  1999.	  80	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	   p.487.	   	   Similar	   sentiments	  were	   expressed	  by	   John	  Moore,	   in	   an	  interview	  with	  the	  author.	  	  	  81	  Peter	  Varghese,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  82	  John	  Dauth,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  83	  Peter	  Varghese,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  84	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	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involvement	  might	   reduce	  Alatas’	   role	   and	   the	   international	  profile	  of	   the	  East	  Timor	  Issue,	  while	  improving	  the	  prospects	  for	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution.	  	  	  Thirdly,	   it	   was	   also	   recognised	   that	   even	   if	   Habibie	   did	   not	   accept	   Howard’s	  suggestion	   of	   a	  Matignon	  Accords-­‐type	   process,	   any	  measure	   that	   reduced	   the	  international	  profile	  of	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue	  would	  have	  a	  short-­‐term	  benefit	  not	  only	  for	  Indonesia,	  but	  also	  for	  Australia	  and	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	  Thawley	  commented	   that	   ‘the	   letter	   did	   not	   lay	   down	   a	   specific	   outcome,	   but	   rather	  advocated	  a	  serious	  high-­‐level	  Indonesian	  political	  process.	   	  Even	  if	  this	  did	  not	  produce	   a	   quick	   result,	   it	   would	   have	   a	   positive	   impact	   for	   Indonesia	   and	  Australia	  in	  the	  short-­‐term’.85	  	  Varghese	  believed	  that	  the	  interregnum	  suggested	  by	   Howard	   might	   have	   had	   a	   dual	   benefit	   –	   it	   would	   have	   maximised	   the	  prospect	  that	  ‘over	  time,	  the	  Timorese	  would	  be	  more	  comfortable	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  remaining	  part	  of	   Indonesia’,	  but	   if	  pursued	   it	  could	  also	  have	  an	   immediate	  impact	  by	  ‘taking	  the	  heat	  out	  of	  the	  issue'.86	  	  The	  letter	  advocated	  a	  patient	  and	  long-­‐term	  solution,	  but	   the	  authors	  were	   cognisant	   that	   any	  Presidential	   effort	  towards	  this	  end	  could	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  	  While	  this	  might	  not	  have	  conclusively	  addressed	  the	  matter	  and	  “lanced	  the	  boil”	  on	  the	  bilateral	  relationship,	   it	   would	   at	   least	   be	   a	   soothing	   balm	   that	   might	   reduce	   the	  diplomatic	  and	  political	  inflammation	  caused	  by	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue.	  	  	  Finally,	   although	   most	   of	   those	   interviewed	   suggested	   that	   domestic	   political	  concerns	   were	   not	   the	   primary	   motivation	   in	   sending	   the	   letter,	   it	   was	  acknowledged	   that	   this	   policy	   shift	   would	   be	   well	   received	   in	   Australia.	  	  Unusually,	  Calvert’s	  submission	  to	  Downer	  is	  quoted	  as	  explicitly	  noting	  that	  the	  policy	   shift	  would	   align	  with	   the	   views	   of	   the	  Australian	   public,	   and	  Downer’s	  near-­‐defeat	   in	   the	  1998	  election	  may	  have	  been	  a	  motivating	   factor.87	  	  Michael	  Thawley	   observed	   that	   ‘in	   light	   of	   the	   worsening	   situation	   in	   East	   Timor…the	  Foreign	  Minister	  would	  want	   to	   be	   active’	   –	   another	   senior	   official	   noted	   that	  Downer	  desired	  to	  ‘show	  initiative	  in	  foreign	  policy’.88	  	  It	  was	  also	  possible	  that	  any	   international	   progress	   could	  mean	   that	   Australia	   would	   be	   ‘left	   behind’	   –	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  86	  Peter	  Varghese,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  87	  See	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	  pp.486-­‐7.	  88	  Michael	  Thawley,	   interview	  with	   author	   and	   a	   former	   senior	  Australian	  Government	  official,	  interview	  with	  author.	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Howard	  was	  concerned	  that	  because	  ‘Habibie	  was	  such	  an	  unpredictable	  person,	  there	   was	   just	   that	   sense	   that	   he	  might	   just	   run	   ahead	   and	  we	  would	   just	   be	  coming	  along	  with	  the	  pack’.89	  	  	  	  	  
Australia’s	  goals	  in	  December	  1998	  Seen	  in	  this	  context,	  the	  Howard	  Letter	  encouraged	  Habibie	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue	  from	  Alatas,	  to	  pursue	  a	  mechanism	  that	  maximised	  the	  chance	  of	  East	  Timor	  willingly	  choosing	   to	  remain	  part	  of	   Indonesia	  and	  to	  reduce	   the	  international	   profile	   of	   the	   issue	   through	   direct	   negotiations	   with	   the	   East	  Timorese.	   	   These	  measures	  would	   assist	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   Australia’s	   strategic	  goals	  –	  maintaining	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  and	  encouraging	   further	  progress	  and	   reform	   in	   Indonesia.	   	   Australian	   officials	   did	   not	   expect	   that	   the	   Howard	  Letter	  would	  precipitate	  immediate	  Indonesian	  action,	  but	  as	  Dauth	  noted	  there	  was	  some	  possibility	  of	  a	  substantive	  response	  –	  ‘a	  lot	  was	  possible	  in	  Indonesia	  in	  those	  days’.90	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  John	  Howard,	  interview	  with	  author.	  90	  John	  Dauth,	  interview	  with	  author.	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Chapter	  4	  
Habibie	  seizes	  the	  initiative	  (December	  1998	  –	  January	  1999)	  
Habibie	  receives	  the	  letter	  The	  letter	  was	  sent	  to	  McCarthy	  in	  Jakarta,	  with	  instructions	  that	  he	  deliver	  it	  to	  directly	  to	  Habibie.	   	  Reluctant	  to	  go	  straight	  to	  the	  President,	  McCarthy	  tried	  to	  deliver	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   letter	   to	   Alatas,	   who	   was	   unavailable.91	  	   Instead,	   on	   21	  December	  he	  delivered	  an	  advance	  copy	  to	  Habibie’s	  international	  adviser,	  Dewi	  Fortuna	  Anwar.92	  	  This	  provided	  her	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  brief	  Habibie	  prior	  to	  his	  meeting	  with	  McCarthy	  the	  next	  day.	  	  	  When	  McCarthy	  met	  with	  Habibie,	  he	  was	  clearly	   indignant	  at	   the	  reference	   to	  the	  Matignon	  Accords.	  	  Habibie	  regarded	  Howard’s	  suggestion—‘that	  Indonesia,	  a	  country	  that	  has	  been	  colonised,	  should	  use	  a	  colonial	  method	  to	  give	  an	  option	  to	  East	  Timor’—as	  ‘insulting’.93	  	  But	  this	  was	  not	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  meeting	  –	  three	  issues	   raised	   by	  Habibie	  would	   later	   exert	   significant	   influences	   on	  Australia’s	  strategic	   policy.	   	   Firstly,	   Habibie	   rebutted	   the	   idea	   that	   he	   could	   simply	  move	  independently	   on	   East	   Timor,	   without	   consulting	   the	   Indonesian	   Parliament.	  	  Habibie	   told	  McCarthy,	   ‘it’s	  not	  my	  decision	  –	   it’s	   the	  MPR’s’.94	  	  Secondly,	  when	  discussing	   the	   possibility	   that	   a	   UN	   contingent	   might	   supervise	   security	  arrangements	  during	  a	  period	  of	  autonomy,	  Habibie	  was	  unequivocal:	  ‘I	  can’t	  do	  that’.95	  	  Finally,	  Habibie	  rejected	  the	   idea	  that	   Indonesia	  could	  continue	  to	   fund	  East	   Timor	   for	   a	   lengthy	   interregnum	   –	   he	   had	   to	   ‘decide	   quickly’	   about	   East	  Timor,	  because	  to	  accept	  Howard’s	  suggestion	  would	  ‘leave	  a	  time	  bomb	  for	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  John	  McCarthy,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  92	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.32.	  	  93	  John	   McCarthy,	   interview	   with	   author.	   	   See	   also	   Edwards	   and	   Goldsworthy,	   Facing	   North,	  p.228.	  94	  John	  McCarthy,	   interview	  with	   author.	   	   See	   also	   the	   diplomatic	   cable	   quoted	   in	   Garran	   and	  Greenlees,	   Deliverance,	   p.76.	   	  Majelis	   Permusyawaratan	   Rakyat	   (MPR)	   –	   People’s	   Consultative	  Assembly).	  	  The	  MPR	  is	  Indonesia’s	  legislative	  branch,	  which	  approved	  the	  incorporation	  of	  East	  Timor	  in	  1976.	  95 	  Edwards	   and	   Goldsworthy,	   Facing	   North,	   p.229.	   	   Although	   Habibie	   later	   allowed	   a	   UN	  administrative	  mission	  in	  East	  Timor,	  this	  statement	  hints	  at	  the	  domestic	  constraints	  that	  would	  later	  inhibit	  the	  deployment	  of	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  peacekeeping	  force.	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successor’.96	  	  Habibie’s	  desire	  for	  rapid	  action	  was	  so	  great	  that	  he	  was	  prepared	  to	   simply	   grant	   the	   East	   Timorese	   independence	   –	   Indonesia	   ‘would	   not	   die	  without	  East	  Timor’.97	  	  Habibie	  stressed	  that	  he	   ‘took	  no	  umbrage’	  at	  Howard’s	  approach,	   but	   rather	   ‘welcomed	   it	   as	   an	   indication	   of	   Australia’s	   continued	  interest	  in	  Indonesian	  issues’.98	  	  	  	  
The	  letter	  leaks,	  revealing	  a	  ‘historic	  policy	  shift’	  Immediately	   before	   Christmas	   in	   1998,	   several	   journalists	   became	   aware	   that	  Australia	   was	   reconsidering	   its	   policy	   on	   East	   Timor.99	  	   They	   sought	   further	  detail	   from	   at	   least	   two	   Australian	   officials,	   but	   were	   not	   told	   of	   the	   Howard	  Letter	  or	  the	  policy	  shift.	  	  On	  11	  January	  1999,	  Downer—who	  was	  on	  holiday—became	  aware	  that	  these	  journalists	  had	  obtained	  sufficient	  information	  to	  write	  a	   story	  concerning	  Australia’s	   change	  of	  policy	  on	  East	  Timor.100	  	  The	  next	  day	  
The	  Australian	  broke	  the	  news	  –	  “Howard	  reverse	  on	  Timor”.101	  	  Given	  that	   the	  article	  was	  co-­‐authored	  by	  a	   Jakarta-­‐based	  correspondent,	   it	   seems	  most	   likely	  that	   an	   Indonesian	   source	   confirmed	   the	   existence	   and	   content	   of	   the	  Howard	  Letter.102	  	  	  	  Downer’s	   office	   quickly	   issued	   a	   press	   release	   announcing	   Australia’s	   ‘historic	  policy	  shift’	  on	  East	  Timor.	   	  Confirming	   the	  Australian	  Government’s	  desire	   for	  ‘an	  act	  of	  self-­‐determination	  at	  some	  future	  time,	  following	  a	  substantial	  period	  of	   autonomy’,	   the	   release	   also	   reaffirmed	   that	   the	   Australian	   Government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.76.	  97	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.32.	  98	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.32.	  99	  This	   account	   is	   predominantly	   based	  on	   interviews	  with	   two	   former	  Australian	  Government	  officials	   who	   requested	   anonymity.	   	   While	   this	   methodology	   has	   obvious	   limitations,	   several	  interviewees	   corroborated	   different	   aspects	   of	   the	   argument	   outlined	   above.	   	   For	   an	   alternate	  explanation,	   see	   Fernandes,	   ‘The	   Road	   to	   INTERFET:	   Bringing	   the	   Politics	   Back	   In’,	   p.87.	  	  Fernandes’	  statement	  that	  an	  Australian	  diplomat	   in	   Jakarta	  was	   instructed	  to	   leak	  the	   letter	   is	  supported	   by	   a	   ‘confidential	   interview’.	   	   Fernandes’	   argument	   of	   a	   deliberate	   leak	   was	   not	  supported	  by	  any	  of	  those	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study.	  100	  Alexander	  Downer,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  101	  See	   Greenlees,	   Don	   and	  McGregor,	   Richard,	   ‘Howard	   reverse	   on	   Timor’,	   The	   Australian,	   12	  January	  1999.	  102	  Although	   it	   is	  possible	   that	   the	   letter	  could	  have	  been	   intentionally	   leaked	  by	  the	  Australian	  Government—either	  for	  domestic	  political	  gain	  or	  to	  pressure	  Habibie	  to	  act	  on	  East	  Timor—no	  reliable	   evidence	   could	   be	   found	   to	   support	   this	   hypothesis.	   	   The	   timing	   of	   the	   leak—while	  Downer	  was	  on	  holidays—also	  casts	  doubt	  on	  this	  possibility.	   	   In	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  author,	  Downer	  stated	  that	  the	  letter	  was	  not	  leaked	  under	  his	  direction.	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‘continues	  to	  recognise	  Indonesian	  sovereignty	  over	  East	  Timor’.103	  	  Importantly,	  at	  a	  press	  conference	  that	  day	  Downer	  affirmed	  Australia’s	  ‘preference’	  that	  East	  Timor	   ‘remain	   legally	   part	   of	   Indonesia’	   –	   he	   also	   cautioned	   against	   any	   quick	  movement	  towards	  a	  vote,	  as	  it	  would	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  violence.104	  	  	  Ever	  sensitive	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  East	  Timor,	  Indonesian	  officials	  were	  particularly	  concerned	  about	  how	  the	  Australian	  Government	  characterised	  their	  shift.	  	  Dewi	  Fortuna	  Anwar	  took	  special	  note	  of	  how	  the	  Australian	  Government	  ‘want	  it	  to	  be	  
seen	  as	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  Australian	  policy’.105	  	  One	  senior	  Australian	  official	  noted	  that	   ‘the	  way	  Downer	  handled	  it	  annoyed	  the	  Indonesians	  further’.106	  	  Although	  there	   is	   little	   data	   concerning	   how	   the	   leak	   of	   the	   letter	   and	   its	   public	  characterisation	  in	  Australia	  might	  have	  influenced	  Habibie,	  prima	  facie,	  it	  seems	  likely	   that	   Australia’s	   description	   of	   the	   ‘historic	   policy	   shift’	   would	   have	  nurtured	   Habibie’s	   instinctive	   reaction	   to	   move	   quickly	   on	   East	   Timor	   –	  diplomatic	   issues	   like	   this	   leak	   were	   just	   another	   reason	   it	   wasn’t	   worth	   the	  trouble.	   	  Thus,	  Australia’s	  response	  to	  the	  leak	  may	  have	  undermined	  its	  desire	  to	  avoid	  an	  ‘early	  and	  final	  decision’	  on	  the	  status	  of	  East	  Timor.107	  	  	  
Habibie	  presents	  Australia	  with	  a	  fait	  accompli	  	  On	  21	  January	  1999,	  Habibie	  distributed	  the	  letter	  to	  five	  of	  his	  Ministers,	  with	  a	  suggestion	   that	   if	   ‘after	   22	   years,	   the	   East	   Timorese	   people	   cannot	   feel	   united	  with	  the	  Indonesian	  people’,	  it	  would	  be	  ‘reasonable	  and	  wise’	  for	  East	  Timor	  to	  separate	  from	  Indonesia.108	  	  Habibie’s	  decision	  was	  approved	  by	  his	  Cabinet	  and	  announced	  on	  27	  January	  1999.	  	  Although	  the	  format	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  decided,	  the	  East	  Timorese	  would	  have	  an	  act	  of	  self-­‐determination.	  	  	  Varghese	   later	   reflected	   that	   Habibie’s	   decision	   to	   hold	   an	   act	   of	   self-­‐determination	  so	  soon	  was	  ‘certainly	  not	  the	  outcome	  we	  were	  looking	  for’.109	  	  In	  fact,	   it	   was	   the	   exact	   opposite	   of	   what	   the	   Howard	   Letter	   sought	   to	   achieve.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  See	   Downer,	   Alexander,	  Media	  Release	   –	  Australian	  Government	  Historic	   Policy	   Shift	   on	  East	  
Timor,	  12	  January	  1999.	  104	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.88.	  105	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.89.	  	  Emphasis	  added.	  106	  Former	  senior	  Australian	  Government	  official,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  107	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.182.	  	  108	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.93.	  109	  Peter	  Varghese,	  interview	  with	  author.	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Downer	   had	   earlier	   noted	   the	   possibility	   that	   rapid	   action	   could	   precipitate	  violence	   in	  East	  Timor	  and	  Habibie’s	  determination	   to	   finalise	   the	   issue	  before	  Indonesia’s	   Presidential	   elections—scheduled	   for	   October	   1999—certainly	  increased	   the	   likelihood	   of	   conflict.110	  	  Habibie’s	   decision	   also	   refocused	   global	  attention	   on	   East	   Timor,	   ensuring	   that	   Indonesia’s	   conduct	   would	   remain	   a	  litmus	   test	   for	   its	   standing	   in	   the	   international	   community.	   	   This	   too	   worked	  against	  Australia’s	  strategic	  objective	  of	  reducing	  the	  international	  profile	  of	  East	  Timor,	   so	   that	   it	   did	   not	   damage	   Indonesia’s	   reputation	   or	   interfere	   with	   its	  access	  to	  international	  financing.	  	  Downer	  was	   ‘astonished’	   by	  Habibie’s	   announcement,	   but	   also	   ‘very	   excited’	   –Paul	   Kelly	   recalls	   a	   private	   conversation	   in	   1999	   where	   Downer	   said	   ‘I	   think	  there	  is	  now	  a	  very	  good	  chance	  that	  East	  Timor	  will	  be	  independent	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  and	  we	  intend	  to	  go	  along	  with	  this’.111	  	  Varghese	  later	  noted	  that	  ‘we	  had	   no	   option	   but	   to	   go	   along	   with	   it….we	   were	   really	   stuck	   with	   it’!112	  	   This	  point	   was	   also	   conceded	   by	   Downer	   in	   2012,	   who	   agreed	   that	   although	   a	  Matignon	  Accords-­‐type	  process	  would	  ‘have	  been	  a	  better	  solution,	  than	  the	  one	  that	   was	   actually	   implemented’,	   Habibie’s	   decision	   essentially	   presented	  Australia	  with	  a	  fait	  accompli.113	  	  
Australia	  reorientates	  Habibie’s	   decision	   ‘cut	   the	   Gordian	   knot	   of	   Indonesian	   East	   Timor	   policy’	   and	  Australia	   scrambled	   to	   find	   the	   loose	   ends.114	  	   From	   this	   point	   on,	   Australian	  policy	  was	  driven	   largely	  by	  events	   in	   Indonesia	  and	  East	  Timor.	   	  A	  consensus	  view	  quickly	  developed	  that	  Australia	  had	  a	  significant	  stake	  in	  ensuring	  that	  any	  act	   of	   self-­‐determination	  was	   “free	   and	   fair”.115	  	   Although	   a	   new	   objective	   had	  arisen,	   this	   was	   tied	   closely	   to	   Australia’s	   enduring	   strategic	   concerns	   –	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  See	  Williams,	  ‘Military	  Ties	  Help,	  Downer	  Insists’.	  111	  Alexander	  Downer,	   interview	  with	  author,	   and	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	   p.492.	   	  Although	  Kelly	   casts	   this	   as	   an	   example	   of	   Downer’s	   intent	   to	   achieve	   East	   Timorese	   independence,	  Downer’s	   choice	   of	   words	   don’t	   seem	   to	   convey	   significant	   enthusiasm	   but	   rather	   imply	   that	  Australia	  didn’t	  have	  much	  of	  a	  choice	  in	  the	  matter.	  	  	  112	  Peter	  Varghese,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  	  113	  Alexander	  Downer,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  author,	  John	  Howard	  also	  agreed	  that	  Australia	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  accept	  Habibie’s	  decision	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli.	  114	  Liddle,	  R.	  William,	  ‘Indonesia	  in	  1999:	  Democracy	  Restored’,	  Asian	  Survey,	  40:1,	  2000,	  p.40.	  115	  Michael	   Thawley,	   John	  Dauth,	   Peter	   Varghese,	   John	  Howard,	   Alexander	  Downer,	   interviews	  with	  author.	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consolidation	   of	   democracy	   in	   Indonesia	   and	   further	   economic,	   political	   and	  civil-­‐military	   reform.	   	   An	   act	   of	   self-­‐determination	   in	   East	   Timor	   endangered	  these	   objectives	   –	   a	   flawed	   ballot	   could	   affect	   international	   financing	   and	   the	  bilateral	  relationship,	  while	  further	  bold	  decisions	  from	  Habibie	  could	  anger	  the	  TNI	   and	   raise	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	   military	   coup.	   	   These	   tensions	   would	   be	  persistent	   influences	   on	   Australia’s	   strategic	   objectives	   and	   policy	   throughout	  1999.	  
Australia	  backing	  independence?	  Or	  ex-­‐post	  facto	  rationalisation?	  One	  prominent	  argument	  is	  that	  Habibie’s	  decision	  prompted	  Australia	  to	  work	  towards	   East	   Timorese	   independence.	   	   Paul	   Kelly	   charges	   that	   as	   ‘1999	  advanced,	   Howard	   and	   Downer	   were	   sure	   that	   independence	   would	   be	   the	  outcome.	   	   By	   their	   position,	   they	   became,	   in	   effect,	   willing	   backers	   of	   an	  independent	  East	  Timor’.116	  	  Kelly	  has	  also	   argued	  elsewhere	   that	   the	   ‘Howard	  government	   decided	   in	   early	   1999	   to	  work	   for	   East	   Timor’s	   independence’.117	  	  Kelly	   intimates	   that	   Howard	   and	   Downer	   considered	   East	   Timorese	  independence	  as	  a	  strategic	  objective	  –	  he	  believes	  that	  their	  decision	  to	  directly	  support	   the	   self-­‐determination	   ballot	   constituted	   a	   ‘covert	   East	   Timor	  independence	  plan’.118	  	  Howard	  himself	  refutes	  this	  view,	   instead	  suggesting	  that	  he	  and	  Downer	  were	  ‘willing	   backers	   of	   a	   free	   and	  unfettered	   act	   of	   self-­‐determination…I	   didn’t	   see	  Australia	  as	  trying	  to	  influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  ballot’.119	  	  Howard	  also	  noted	  that	  in	  early	  1999	  he	  was	  unsure	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  East	  Timorese	  would	  indeed	  vote	  for	   independence.120	  	  Kelly’s	  assertion	  also	  clashes	  with	  the	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  reporting	   of	   John	   McCarthy,	   who	   until	   July	   1999	   was	   unsure	   as	   to	   the	   likely	  outcome	  of	  the	  ballot.121	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  early-­‐1999	  decision	  to	  support	  an	  act	  of	  self-­‐determination	  in	  East	  Timor	  did	  not	  automatically	  equate	  to	  support	   for	  independence.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	  p.493.	  117	  Kelly,	  ‘John	  Howard's	  covert	  East	  Timor	  independence	  plan’.	  118	  See	  Kelly,	  ‘John	  Howard's	  covert	  East	  Timor	  independence	  plan’.	  119	  John	  Howard,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  120	  John	  Howard,	  interview	  with	  author.	  121	  John	  McCarthy,	  interview	  with	  author.	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Although	  Australia’s	  work	   towards	  a	   free	  and	   fair	  ballot	  certainly	  assisted	  East	  Timor’s	  subsequent	  vote	  for	  independence,	  influencing	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  ballot	  was	  never	  a	  strategic	  objective	  for	  Australia.	  	  None	  of	  those	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study	   claimed	   that	  Australia	  was—at	   any	   point	   in	   1998	   or	   1999—deliberately	  working	  to	  achieve	  East	  Timorese	  independence.122	  	  Throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1999,	  Australia	  explicitly	  confirmed	  on	  many	  occasions	   that	   its	  preference	  was	  for	   East	   Timor	   to	   be	   incorporated	   into	   Indonesia.123	  	   Australia	   only	   adopted	   a	  ‘neutral’	   standpoint	   in	   early	   August,	   when	   it	   was	   clear	   the	   pro-­‐independence	  sentiment	  would	  likely	  prevail	  at	  the	  ballot	  box.124	  	  
Australia’s	  strategic	  objectives	  after	  Habibie’s	  announcement	  Once	   Habibie	   had	   made	   his	   decision	   in	   late	   January	   1999,	   Australia’s	   new	  strategic	   objective	  was	   simple	   –	   ‘to	   see	   the	   ballot	   not	   just	   occur,	   but	   to	   see	   it	  occur	  credibly’.125	  	  Australia	  was	  determined	  to	  see	   this	  happen	  not	  due	  to	  any	  noble	   or	   idealistic	   desire	   to	   realise	   an	   independent	   East	   Timor,	   but	   because	  Habibie	  had	  staked	  his	  country’s	  reputation	  on	  this	  ballot	  –	  Australia	  believed	  it	  had	   no	   choice	   but	   to	   help.	   	   Now	   playing	   second	   fiddle	   to	   Habibie,	   Australian	  policy	   was	   faced	   with	   the	   difficult	   task	   of	   managing	   competing	   objectives	   –	  achieving	  a	  free	  and	  fair	  ballot,	  managing	  violence	  in	  East	  Timor	  and	  maintaining	  the	   bilateral	   relationship,	   all	   while	   encouraging	   Indonesia’s	   continued	  democratic	  development.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Many,	  in	  fact,	  emphatically	  refuted	  Kelly’s	  argument.	  123	  See,	   for	  example,	   Johnstone,	  Craig	  and	  Spencer,	   Stephen,	   ‘Howard	  pledges	  police	   for	  Timor’,	  
The	  Courier	  Mail,	  28	  April	  1999.	  124	  See	  Murdoch,	  Lindsay,	  ‘We’re	  Neutral	  on	  Timor:	  Downer’,	  The	  Age,	  01	  August	  1999.	  125	  John	  Dauth,	  interview	  with	  author.	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Chapter	  5	  
Dealing	  with	  the	  violence	  (February	  –	  April	  1999)	  
Agreement	  on	  a	  ballot	  as	  the	  violence	  intensifies	  Habibie	  had	  decided	  that	  East	  Timor	  would	  have	  an	  act	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  but	  there	  was	  still	   considerable	  debate	  as	   to	  how	  this	  might	  actually	  occur.	   	  At	   the	  conclusion	   of	   a	   Tripartite	   meeting	   in	   early	   February	   1999,	   Alatas	   articulated	  Indonesia’s	   view	   that	   ‘a	   referendum	  was	  not	   the	  way	   to	  proceed,	   because	   that	  would	  only	  reopen	  old	  wounds	  and	  re-­‐ignite	  old	  tensions’.126	  	  Although	  alternate	  options	  were	  considered	  by	  Jamsheed	  Marker	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Secretary	  General,	  Kofi	  Annan,	  these	  were	  discounted	  and	  on	  11	  March	  1999	  it	  was	  agreed	  that	  a	  direct	  ballot	  would	  be	  conducted.127	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  situation	  in	  East	  Timor	  was	  beginning	  to	  worsen.	  	  In	  response	  to	  Habibie’s	   offer	   of	   a	   special	   status	   in	   1998,	   pro-­‐integration	  militias	   had	   formed	  and	   in	   February	   1999	   there	   were	   reports	   that	   they	   were	   receiving	   arms	   and	  supplies	  from	  the	  TNI.128	  	  In	  late	  February	  Downer	  voiced	  his	  concerns	  to	  Alatas,	  but	   these	   were	   dismissed:	   Alatas	   claimed	   the	   TNI	   was	   not	   establishing	   new	  militia	  groups	  but	  arming	  civil	  defence	  units,	  which	  was	  a	   ‘legitimate’	  action.129	  	  This	  demarche	  would	  establish	  a	  pattern	  repeated	  regularly	  throughout	  1999	  –	  Australian	  officials	  would	  raise	  their	  concerns	  about	  security	  in	  East	  Timor,	  only	  to	  have	  these	  rebuffed	  or	  ignored	  by	  their	  Indonesian	  counterparts.	   	  Concerned	  over	   how	   the	   violence	   could	   adversely	   affect	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	   and	  Indonesia’s	   international	   standing,	   throughout	   1999	   Australian	   ministers—particularly	   Downer—would	   consistently	   downplay	   the	   connections	   between	  the	  militias	  and	  TNI.130	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Alatas,	  The	  Pebble	  in	  the	  Shoe,	  p.157.	  127	  United	  Nations	  Press	  Release,	  SG/SM/6922,	  12	  March	  1999.	  	  128	  Greenlees,	  Don,	  ‘E	  Timor	  –	  divide	  and	  conquer’,	  The	  Australian,	  06	  February	  1999.	  129	  Edwards	  and	  Goldsworthy,	  Facing	  North,	  p.232.	  	  See	  also	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	  p.496.	  130	  See	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	  p.496.	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Tensions	  in	  Australian	  policy	  –	  diplomacy	  or	  peacekeeping?	  In	  late	  February,	  Calvert	  and	  Varghese	  had	  several	  meetings	  with	  the	  American	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Stanley	  Roth,	  to	  discuss	  East	  Timor.	   	  The	  summary	  records	   of	   these	  meetings	   leaked	   in	   1999	   and	   are	   used	   by	   some	   to	   argue	   that	  Australia	   was	   determined	   to	   prevent	   the	   deployment	   of	   a	   peacekeeping	   force	  (PKF).131	  	   However,	   comprehensive	   accounts	   reveal	   a	   more	   nuanced	   position:	  Calvert	  believed	   that	   the	   international	   community	  could	   ‘induce	  East	  Timorese	  and	  Indonesian	  leaders	  to	  work	  towards	  an	  orderly	  and	  peaceful	  transition	  and	  to	   avert	   the	   need	   for	   recourse	   to	   peacekeepers’. 132 	  	   Varghese	   echoed	   this	  sentiment	  by	  noting	  that	  ‘an	  early	  offer	  of	  a	  peacekeeping	  operation	  [PKO]	  would	  remove	   any	   incentive	   for	   the	   East	   Timorese	   and	   Indonesians	   to	   sort	   out	   their	  differences’.133	  	   Although	   Roth	   maintained	   his	   personal	   belief	   that	   a	   ‘full-­‐scale	  peacekeeping	   operation	   would	   be	   an	   unavoidable	   aspect	   of	   the	   transition’,134	  only	  a	   few	  weeks	   later	  he	  publicly	   supported	  Australia’s	  policy	  by	   testifying	   to	  Congress	   that	   ‘it	   is	  way	  premature	   to	   talk	   about	   troops	   in	  East	  Timor…we	   are	  pushing	  so	  aggressively	  to	  try	  to	  break	  this	  cycle	  of	  violence	  so	  that	  we	  will	  not	  have	  to	  end	  up	  with	  the	  hard	  choices	  about	  a	  PKO’.135	  	  	  	  	  Critically,	  Calvert	  and	  Varghese	  were	  not	  arguing	  that	  Australia	  was	  unwilling	  to	  contribute	  towards	  a	  PKF	  in	  East	  Timor	  –	  Calvert	  specifically	  noted	  that	  Australia	  would	   be	  willing	   to	   deploy	   peacekeepers	   if	   required,	   as	   long	   as	   they	  were	   not	  sent	  into	  a	  ‘bloodbath’.136	  	  Although	  officials	  understood	  the	  rationale	  for	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	   PKF,	   they	   believed	   that	   Indonesia	   would	   simply	   never	   accept	   such	   a	  deployment	  –	   this	  sentiment	  was	  clearly	  conveyed	   in	  Habibie’s	   initial	   response	  to	   the	   Howard	   Letter	   in	   December	   1998.137	  	   Although	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   PKF	  was	   not	   precluded,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   most	   Australian	   decision-­‐makers	   readily	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  See	  Fernandes,	  Clinton,	  ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET:	  Bringing	  the	  Politics	  Back	  In’,	  pp.88-­‐89.	  132	  Lyons,	  John,	  ‘The	  Secret	  Timor	  Dossier’,	  The	  Bulletin,	  12	  October	  1999.	  133	  Lyons,	   ‘The	  Secret	  Timor	  Dossier’.	   	   Importantly,	  at	  this	  point	  the	  mechanism	  for	  testing	  East	  Timorese	  opinion	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  decided	  –	  this	  might	  have	  influenced	  Calvert	  and	  Varghese’s	  views	  on	  the	  prospects	  for	  violence.	  	  	  	  134	  Lyons,	  ‘The	  Secret	  Timor	  Dossier’.	  135	  Stanley	  Roth,	  in	  testimony	  to	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  Congress,	  ‘Indonesia:	  countdown	  to	  elections’,	  hearing	  before	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  East	  Asian	  and	  Pacific	  Affair	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  United	  States	  Senate,	  one	  hundred	  and	  sixth	  Congress,	  first	  session,	  18	  March	  1999,	  p.17.	  	  	  136	  Lyons,	  ‘The	  Secret	  Timor	  Dossier’.	  137	  Peter	  Varghese,	  John	  McCarthy,	  interviews	  with	  author.	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accepted	   Habibie’s	   position	   that	   an	   international	   presence	   in	   East	   Timor	   was	  unacceptable.	  	  At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  Australia’s	  strategic	  policy	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  violence	   in	   East	   Timor	   through	   private	   representations	   to	   the	   Indonesian	  Government	  and	  the	  TNI.	  	  	  Despite	  this	  preference	  to	  avoid	  an	  Australian	  Defence	  Force	  (ADF)	  deployment,	  the	  Department	  of	  Defence	  knew	  that	  if	  violence	  escalated	  in	  East	  Timor	  then	  a	  PKF	  might	  be	  required.	  	  Though	  DFAT	  believed	  that	  the	  ‘very	  fact	  of	  raising	  force	  readiness	  levels’	  might	  become	  something	  of	  a	  ‘self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy’,138	  on	  09	  February	  1999	  the	  NSCC	  approved	  a	  Defence	  recommendation	  to	  bring	  another	  Australian	  Army	  Brigade	  to	  a	  greater	  state	  of	  readiness.139	  	  This	  was	  announced	  by	  Defence	  Minister	  John	  Moore	  on	  11	  March	  1999	  -­‐	  downplaying	  the	  notion	  that	  this	  decision	  was	  made	  solely	  with	  reference	  to	  East	  Timor,	  he	  emphasised	  that	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  East	  Timorese	  retained	  responsibility	  for	  security	  and	  that	  it	  would	   be	   ‘premature	   to	   make	   any	   decision	   about	   ADF	   involvement	   in	   any	  peacekeeping	  role’.140	  	  Despite	  Moore’s	  public	  claim,	  one	  of	   the	  key	  reasons	   for	  this	   decision	   was	   the	   possibility	   that	   Australia	   might	   make	   a	   substantial	  contribution	  to	  a	  PKF	  in	  East	  Timor	  –	  Defence	  had	  explained	  to	  the	  NSCC	  that	  the	  single	   Brigade	   already	   at	   a	   higher	   level	   of	   operational	   readiness	   would	   be	  insufficient	   to	   secure	   East	   Timor. 141 	  	   A	   long-­‐term,	   multi-­‐nation	   PKF—with	  Indonesian	  consent—would	  be	  the	  only	  realistic	  scenario.142	  	  
Confusion	  over	  the	  Tripartite	  process	  Against	  this	  backdrop,	  Defence	  began	  to	  plan	  not	  for	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF,	  but	  rather	  a	   post-­‐ballot	   PKF	   that	  would	   ‘take	   responsibility	   for	   security	   over	   from	  TNI	   if	  East	   Timor	   opted	   for	   independence’.143	  	   However,	   there	   was	   a	   question	   as	   to	  whether	  the	  Tripartite	  process	  would	  make	  provision	  for	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF.	  	  The	  UN	  argued	  for	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  during	  a	  Tripartite	  meeting	  on	  10-­‐11	  March,	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Paul	  Barratt,	   interview	  with	   author.	   	  This	   view	  was	   supported	  by	   John	  Moore,	  Chris	  Barrie,	  Allan	  Behm	  and	  Hugh	  White,	  in	  interviews	  with	  the	  author.	  	  	  139	  Connery,	  Crisis	  Policymaking,	  pp.23-­‐24,	  and	  White,	  ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET’,	  p.75.	  	  	  140	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Hansard,	  11	  March	  1999.	  141	  Hugh	  White,	  John	  Moore,	  interviews	  with	  author.	  	  Some	  interviewees	  also	  noted	  that	  a	  single	  Brigade	   at	   higher	   readiness	   would	   not	   be	   sufficient	   if	   circumstances	   warranted	   simultaneous	  deployments	  in	  the	  South-­‐West	  Pacific.	  142	  Paul	  Barratt,	  interview	  with	  author.	  143	  White,	  ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET’,	  p.76.	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this	   suggestion	  was	   ‘indignantly	   rejected	   by	  Alatas,	  who	   argued	   forcefully	   that	  this	   was	   a	  matter	   of	   national	   honour	   and	   sovereignty’.144	  	   In	   late	  March	   1999	  Francsec	  Vendrell,	  Deputy	  Personal	  Representative	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  for	  East	   Timor,	   visited	   Canberra	   to	   discuss	   East	   Timor	   with	   a	   variety	   of	  Departments.145	  	  In	  these	  talks,	  White	  suggested	  that	  although	  he	  wasn’t	  formally	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Australian	  Government,	  the	  ADF	  would	  probably	  make	  a	  ‘substantial	  contribution’	  if	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  was	  organised	  by	  the	  UN.146	  	  	  It	   seems	   that	   this	   view	   was	   not	   shared	   by	   other	   Australian	   Government	  Departments.	   	   Varghese	   noted	   that	   at	   this	   time	   PM&C	   officials	   believed	   that	  although	   a	   PKF	   was	   desirable	   ‘it	   was	   unrealistic,	   because	   the	   Indonesians	  wouldn’t	   accept	   it’. 147 	  	   On	   25	   March	   1999,	   DFAT	   advised	   Downer	   that	   it	  concurred	   with	   the	   UN’s	   advice,	   that	   ‘given	   Indonesia’s	   sovereignty	   over	   the	  province	   during	   the	   period	   of	   the	   ballot,	   that	   TNI	   retain	   responsibility	   for	  security’.148	  	  The	  official	  publication	  from	  DFAT	  notes	  that	  Vendrell	  emphasised:	  	  There	  was	  no	  prospect	  of	   the	  Indonesian	  Government	  acquiescing	  to	  any	  form	  of	  non-­‐Indonesian	  military	  or	  police	  presence	  to	  assist	  with	  ensuring	  security	  in	  the	  period	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  consultation.	  	  Planning	  for	  a	  security	  contingent	  would	  have	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  post-­‐ballot	  period.149	  	  	  Vendrell	   reported	   back	   to	   the	   UN	   and	   recommended	   a	   variety	   of	  measures	   to	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  of	  violence,	  but—perhaps	  believing	  it	  to	  be	  a	  lost	  cause—his	  advice	  stopped	  short	  of	  advocating	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF.150	  	  	  Clearly,	   the	   Australian	   Government	   was	   not	   united	   on	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	   pre-­‐ballot	  PKF.	  	  Downer	  believed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  prospect	  of	  Indonesia	  accepting	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Marker,	  East	  Timor,	  p.139.	  145	  Lyons,	  ‘The	  Secret	  Timor	  Dossier’,	  p.28	  and	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  pp.72-­‐74.	  146	  Hugh	  White,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  See	  also	  White,	  ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET’,	  p.78.	  	  147	  Peter	  Varghese,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  148	  Edwards	  and	  Goldsworthy,	  Facing	  North,	  p.239.	  	  The	  source	  cited	  for	  this	  claim	  is	  a	  Ministerial	  Submission,	  dated	  25	  March	  1999.	  149	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.74.	  150	  Martin,	  Ian,	  Self-­‐Determination	  in	  East	  Timor,	  Boulder	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers	  Inc,	  2001,	  pp.29-­‐33.	   	   Martin	   notes	   that	   Vendrell	   recommended	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   some	   TNI	   and	   the	  disarming	  of	  militia	  groups.	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pre-­‐ballot	   PKF,	   so	   it	  would	   be	   unhelpful	   to	   press	   the	   issue.151	  	   Defence	   argued	  that	   the	   UN	   should	   pursue	   this	   option	   through	   the	   Tripartite	   process,	   while	  DFAT	   and	   PM&C	   officials	   accepted	   Indonesia’s	   insistence	   that	   TNI	   provide	  security.	   	  The	  common	  view	  of	  the	  Tripartite	  process—scepticism	  bordering	  on	  disdain—may	  have	  also	  caused	  Australian	  officials	  to	  overlook	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  security	  arrangements	  that	  might	  be	  agreed	  by	  the	  UN.	  	  	  
Australia	  tries	  to	  maintain	  the	  ADF-­‐TNI	  relationship	  In	  September	  1998	  Australia’s	  Chief	  of	   the	  Defence	  Force	   (CDF),	  Admiral	  Chris	  Barrie,	   had	   travelled	   to	   Jakarta	   to	   meet	   with	   General	  Wiranto,	   who	   was	   both	  Barrie’s	  direct	  military	  counterpart	  as	  well	  as	   the	  Indonesian	  Defence	  Minister.	  	  During	   a	   meeting	   with	   Habibie	   and	   Wiranto,	   it	   was	   agreed	   that	   an	   ADF-­‐TNI	  conference	   on	   civil-­‐military	   relations	   would	   be	   held	   in	   1999.152	  	   From	   09-­‐11	  March	  1999,	  several	  senior	  ADF	  officers	  and	  Defence	  officials	  visited	   Jakarta	   to	  attend	  what	  was	  known	  as	  the	  “CDF-­‐PANGAB	  Forum”.153	  	  Amid	  discussion	  on	  the	  TNI’s	   role	   in	   post-­‐Suharto	   Indonesia,	   Barrie	   privately	   encouraged	   Wiranto	   to	  make	  sure	   the	  TNI	  placed	  significant	  effort	   into	  ensuring	  a	   free	  and	   fair	  ballot,	  which	   would	   hopefully	   result	   in	   the	   incorporation	   of	   East	   Timor.154	  	   As	   the	  decision	   to	   raise	   the	   readiness	   of	   an	   Australian	   Army	   brigade	   was	   to	   be	  announced	   on	   11	   March,	   Barrie	   was	   also	   tasked	   to	   explain	   this	   to	   Wiranto.	  	  Mindful	  of	  how	  Wiranto	  might	  perceive	  this	  action,	  Barrie	  ‘had	  to	  try	  to	  persuade	  him	  that	  it	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  East	  Timor’.155	  	  	  Importantly,	  events	  such	  as	  this	  contributed	  to	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  ADF	  was	  capable	   of	   influencing	   the	   TNI’s	   senior	   leadership	   –	   beyond	   supporting	  Indonesia’s	  progress	  through	  the	  IMF	  and	  international	  funding	  efforts,	  Australia	  was	   also	   concerned	  with	   directly	   supporting	   the	   TNI	   in	   their	   effort	   to	   achieve	  further	   civil-­‐military	   reform.	   	   Former	  Defence	   officials	   noted	   that	   at	   this	   point	  the	  TNI-­‐ADF	  relationship	  was	  extremely	  strong,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	   CDF-­‐PANGAB	   Forum	   and	   the	   close	   cooperation	   on	   the	   possibility	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Alexander	  Downer,	  interview	  with	  author.	  152	  Allan	  Behm,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  153	  Panglima	   Angkatan	   Bersenjata	   Republik	   Indonesia	   (PANGAB)	   –	   Commander	   of	   the	   Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Indonesia.	  	  	  154	  Chris	  Barrie,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  155	  Chris	  Barrie,	  interview	  with	  author.	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evacuation	   flights	   for	   Australian	   citizens	   ahead	   of	   the	   Indonesian	   Presidential	  elections.156	  	  	  
Significant	  violence	  challenges	  Australia’s	  approach	  During	   the	   first	   few	  months	  of	   1999,	  Australia’s	   intelligence	   agencies	  began	   to	  warn	   the	   Government	   that	   the	   TNI	   were	   supporting	   militia	   violence	   in	   East	  Timor.	   	   A	   Defence	   Intelligence	   Organisation	   (DIO)	   Current	   Intelligence	  Brief	   in	  early	   March	   assessed	   that	   ‘further	   violence	   is	   certain’	   –	   while	   it	   noted	   that	  Wiranto’s	  views	  on	   the	  violence	  were	  not	  known,	  DIO	  believed	   that	  he	  was	   ‘at	  least	   turning	   a	   blind	   eye’. 157 	  	   On	   06	   April	   1999	   militia	   forces	   attacked	   a	  churchyard	  in	  Liquica,	  killing	  up	  to	  sixty	  civilians	  in	  what	  was	  East	  Timor’s	  most	  violent	   incident	   since	   the	   Santa	   Cruz	   massacre	   in	   1991.158	  	   DIO	   reported	   two	  days	  later	  that	  while	  the	  TNI’s	  	  ‘exact	  role	  in	  the	  incident	  is	  unclear…[TNI	  troops]	  had	  fired	  tear	  gas	  into	   the	   church	   and	   apparently	   did	   not	   intervene	   when	   the	   pro-­‐independence	  activists	  were	  attacked…[TNI]	  is	  culpable	  whether	  it	  actively	  took	  part	  in	  the	  violence,	  or	  simply	  let	  it	  occur’.159	  	  	  On	   17	   April	   pro-­‐integration	  militias	   attacked	   independence	   supporters	   in	   Dili,	  killing	   between	   12	   and	   28.160	  	   These	   incidents	  were	   a	   significant	   escalation	   of	  violence	   and	   showcased	   the	   inability	   or	   unwillingness	   of	   the	   TNI	   to	   restrain	  militia	   activity.	   	   If	   allowed	   to	   continue	   unchecked,	   such	   incidents	   would	  endanger	   the	   ballot	   and	   significantly	   damage	   Indonesia’s	   reputation.	   	   Ugly	  scenarios	   began	   to	   concern	   Australian	   officials:	   if	   the	   ballot	   was	   subverted	  through	  a	   campaign	  of	  militia	  violence,	   it	  might	  ensure	  a	  very	  close	  outcome	  –	  perhaps	   in	   favour	   of	   independence	   by	   only	   a	   few	   percentage	   points. 161	  	  Combined	   with	   possible	   allegations	   of	   impropriety	   around	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	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  Allan	  Behm,	  Chris	  Barrie,	  interviews	  with	  author.	  	  	  157	  Ball,	   Desmond,	   ‘Silent	   witness:	   Australian	   intelligence	   and	   East	   Timor’,	   The	   Pacific	   Review,	  14:1,	  2001,	  p.44.	  158	  Garran	   and	   Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	   p.120.	   	   It	   is	   believed	   that	   between	   150-­‐270	   died	   in	   the	  Santa	  Cruz	  massacre	  –	  see	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  pp.7-­‐8.	  159	  Ball,	  ‘Silent	  Witness’,	  p.46.	  160	  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.67.	  161	  Hugh	  White,	  interview	  with	  author.	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vote,	  this	  could	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  Indonesian	  MPR	  to	  retain	  East	  Timor.162	  	  Thus,	  militia	  violence	  was	  placing	  Australia’s	  strategic	  objective	  of	  a	  free	  and	  fair	  ballot	  at	  serious	  risk.	  
The	  Bali	  Summit	  On	   19	   April	   1999,	   Howard	   telephoned	   Habibie,	   urging	   him	   to	   prevent	   further	  violence	   in	  East	  Timor	  –	  Howard	  suggested	  a	  meeting,	  which	  was	  arranged	   for	  27	  April	  in	  Bali.163	  	  Only	  a	  few	  days	  before	  the	  summit,	  Australian	  officials	  were	  informed	  that	  the	  Tripartite	  arrangements—which	  had	  been	  agreed,	  but	  not	  yet	  signed—had	   assigned	   responsibility	   for	   security	   to	   the	   TNI. 164 	  	   Given	   the	  violence	   of	   the	   preceding	   two	   weeks,	   Varghese	   noted	   that	   Australian	   officials	  were	   ‘concerned	   about	   how	   all	   of	   this	   could	   spin	   badly	   out	   of	   control’.165	  	   The	  Australian	  delegation	  agreed	  that	  some	  form	  of	  increased	  international	  presence	  would	   be	   required	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   ballot	   would	   be	   perceived	   as	  legitimate.	  	  	  But	   Habibie	   had	   already	   signalled	   his	   intent	   to	   resist	   a	   PKF	   –	   in	   their	   phone	  conversation,	   he	   told	  Howard	   that	   if	   a	   PKF	   ‘was	   imposed	   on	   Indonesia	   then	   it	  would	  abandon	  East	  Timor	  and	  the	  ballot	  and	  unilaterally	  withdraw’.166	  	  Downer	  regarded	   this	   threat	   as	   one	   of	   ‘Habibie’s	   constant	   secret	   messages	   to	   us’	   –	  avoiding	   this	   scenario,	  which	   could	   amount	   to	   civil	  war	   in	   East	   Timor,	  was	   an	  objective	  that	  had	  to	  be	  balanced	  carefully	  against	  the	  need	  for	  a	  fair	  ballot.167	  	  There	   is	   no	   question	   that	   the	   Australian	   delegation	   would	   have	   preferred	   the	  ballot	  to	  be	  supervised	  by	  a	  multi-­‐nation	  PKF.168	  	  But	  many	  were	  sceptical	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  was	  possible.	  	  Varghese	  believed	  it	  was	  a	  ‘pie	  in	  the	  sky’	  concept	  –	  there	  was	  ‘no	  point	  going	  on	  and	  on	  about	  something	  which	  is	  just	  not	  going	  to	  happen’. 169 	  	   Dauth	   notes	   that	   ‘it	   wasn’t	   an	   easy	   period	   dealing	   with	   the	  Indonesian	  system…[we]	  made	  very	  careful	  judgements	  about	  every	  engagement	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  author.	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  McCarthy,	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  with	  author.	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  with	  author.	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with	   them,	   and	  one	  of	   those	   judgements	  had	   to	  be	  how	  much	  we	  pressed	  him	  [Habibie]’.170	  	  Although	  Habibie	  had	  consolidated	  his	  political	  position	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  Suharto,	  there	  was	  concern	  that	  his	  policy	  freedom	  on	  East	  Timor	  was	  still	  constrained	  by	  the	  TNI.	  	  Wiranto	  had	  accepted	  Habibie’s	  decision	  to	  conduct	  an	  act	  of	   self-­‐determination,	  but	   it	  was	   felt	   that	  he	  would	   flatly	   refuse	   to	  accept	  a	  foreign	  military	  presence	  on	  Indonesian	  soil.	  	  The	  Summit	  began	  with	  a	  private	  meeting	  between	  Howard	  and	  Habibie	  –	  in	  this	  discussion,	  Howard	  suggested	  that	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  might	  assist	  with	  security	  in	  East	   Timor.171	  	   Howard	   writes	   that	   this	   produced	   a	   ‘metaphorical	   explosion’	  from	  Habibie,	  who	  explained	  that	  his	  ‘position	  would	  be	  absolutely	  untenable	  in	  Jakarta	  if	  he	  were	  to	  agree	  to	  this’	  request.172	  	  Although	  the	  point	  was	  not	  made	  explicitly	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  had	  Habibie	  accepted	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF,	  this	  could	  have	  precipitated	  a	  civil-­‐military	  showdown	  and	  posed	  a	  grave	  risk	  of	  a	  TNI	  coup.	  	  Two	  conflicting	  Indonesian	  accounts	  of	  this	  meeting	  raise	  some	  questions	  about	  how	   hard	   Howard	   pushed	   Habibie.	   	   Dewi	   Fortuna	   Anwar	   believes	   Howard	  ‘pressed	   a	   number	   of	   times’,	   asking	   ‘explicitly’	   if	   Habibie	  would	   accept	   a	   PKF,	  whereas	  Alatas	  believes	  that	  Howard’s	  approach	  was	  ‘not	  very	  strong…he	  raised	  it	  because	  he	  probably	  needed	   to	   raise	   it’.173	  	  Howard	  himself	  didn’t	   think	   that	  Habibie	   would	   agree	   to	   his	   request,	   but	   ‘thought	   it	   was	   worth	   trying…he’d	  already	   surprised	   me	   once!’174	  	   Once	   it	   had	   been	   determined	   that	   a	   PKF	   was	  precluded,	   the	   discussion	   turned	   to	   civilian	   police	   (CIVPOL)	   under	   UN	  authorisation	  –	  Habibie	  agreed	   to	  allow	  between	  200-­‐300	  CIVPOL	  to	  supervise	  the	  ballot.175	  	  	  	  This	  private	  discussion	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  large	  plenary	  meeting,	  where	  Howard	  pushed	  for	  a	  large	  CIVPOL	  contingent.	  	  	  This	  suggestion	  visibly	  angered	  Wiranto,	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  Howard,	  Lazarus	  Rising,	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who	   had	   an	   animated	   discussion	   with	   Habibie.176	  	   Paul	   Kelly’s	   account	   of	   this	  meeting	  even	  has	  Wiranto	  gesturing	  aggressively	  to	  Habibie,	  indicating	  that	  any	  foreign	  presence	  in	  East	  Timor	  would	  be	  unacceptable.177	  	  Howard	  then	  pointed	  beyond	  East	  Timor	  to	  Indonesia	  itself,	  noting	  that	  if	  the	  ballot	  was	  anything	  less	  than	  free	  and	  fair	  then	  ‘Indonesia’s	  international	  standing	  would	  be	  damaged’.178	  	  Eventually,	   it	  was	  decided	   that	   an	   ‘adequate’	   number	   of	  UN	  CIVPOL—between	  200-­‐300	   officers,	   as	   agreed	   in	   the	   private	   Howard-­‐Habibie	   meeting—would	  assist	  Indonesian	  police	  in	  East	  Timor.179	  	  	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  such	  a	  small	  force	  would	  be	  incapable	  of	  preventing	  widespread	  violence,	   but	   it	   was	   hoped	   that	   the	   increased	   international	   presence—directly	  assisting	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   ballot—might	   deter	   violence	   and	   reduce	   voter	  intimidation.	  	  Significantly,	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  meeting	  Howard	  noted	  that	  it	  was	   still	   Australia’s	   preference	   to	   see	   East	   Timor	   choose	   incorporation	   with	  Indonesia.180	  	  	  
Was	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  ever	  possible?	  Hugh	  White	   has	   since	   argued	   that	   in	   not	   corralling	   international	   support	   for	   a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  and	  pushing	  Habibie	  further,	  Australia	  may	  have	  ‘missed	  the	  last	  best	  chance	  to	  avoid	  the	  disasters	  of	  September’.181	  	  Though	  White	  is	  correct	  in	  reflecting	  that	  ‘there	  was	  little	  we	  could	  do,	  but	  we	  did	  less	  than	  we	  could	  have’,	  it	   is	   unlikely	   that	  more	   strenuous	   efforts	   would	   have	   succeeded	   in	   securing	   a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF.182	  	  International	  pressure	  on	  Indonesia	  may	  have	  helped,	  but	  the	  focus	   of	   the	   US	   and	   European	   powers	   was	   on	   events	   in	   the	   Balkans	   –	   it	   was	  difficult	  for	  Australia	  to	  attract	  Washington	  DC’s	  attention	  to	  East	  Timor.183	  	  The	  violence	  of	  April	  1999	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  was	  desirable,	  but	   it	  came	  too	  late	  in	  the	  Tripartite	  process	  to	  substantively	  impact	  the	  negotiations.	  	  Indonesian	  domestic	  politics	  also	  placed	  pressure	  on	   the	  process	  –	   Indonesia’s	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next	   President	  would	   be	   elected	   in	  October	   1999	   and	   it	  was	   feared	   that	   if	   the	  ballot	  was	  delayed,	  then	  a	  new	  President	  might	  refuse	  to	  release	  East	  Timor.	  	  	  An	  early	  1999	  effort	  to	  secure	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  would	  also	  have	  entailed	  serious	  risks	   for	   Australia’s	   primary	   strategic	   objectives.	   	   As	   evidenced	   by	   Habibie’s	  frank	   comments	   to	   Howard	   in	   Bali—as	   well	   as	   Wiranto’s	   behaviour	   in	   the	  plenary	  meeting,	  which	  Kelly	  characterises	  as	  Wiranto	  ‘giving	  Habibie	  his	  orders	  even	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Australians’—Habibie’s	  acceptance	  of	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  might	  have	   precipitated	   a	   TNI	   coup.184	  	   From	   the	   US	   perspective,	   Stanley	   Roth	   was	  particularly	  concerned	  that	  pressure	  for	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  might	  threaten	  the	  vote	  itself.	  	  Jamsheed	  Marker	  notes	  that	  in	  late	  April	  1999	  Roth:	  made	   a	   forceful	   representation	   to	   us	   [the	   UN]	   about	   putting	  anything,	   either	   specific	   or	   conditional,	   to	   the	   Indonesians	   that	  could	  make	   President	   Habibie,	   whom	   Roth	   described	   as	   being	   at	  the	   end	   of	   this	   tether	   as	   regards	   East	   Timor,	   balk	   at	   the	   last	  fence.185	  	  Opinion	   is	   divided	   on	   the	   efficacy	   of	   Howard’s	   meeting	   with	   Habibie.	   	   For	  McCarthy,	  an	  agreement	  for	  UN	  CIVPOL	  ‘was	  presented	  as	  a	  victory….but	  really	  it	  was	  a	   loss,	  because	  we	  didn’t	  get	  peacekeepers’.186	  	  Varghese	  believes	  Australia	  ‘pushed	  as	  hard	  as	  we	  could,	  and	  what	  we	  ended	  up	  with	  on	  the	  police	  side	  was	  probably	  a	  bit	  more	  than	  we	  might	  have	  expected’.187	  	  Given	  Australia’s	  relatively	  weak	   bargaining	   position—and	   Habibie’s	   precarious	   situation	   with	   regards	   to	  the	   TNI—Howard	   probably	   achieved	   all	   he	   could	   at	   the	   Bali	   Summit	   without	  endangering	   Australia’s	   primary	   strategic	   objectives.	   	   Given	   the	   importance	  Australia	  placed	  on	  supporting	  Indonesia’s	  democratisation	  and	  maintaining	  the	  bilateral	   relationship,	   the	  cautious	  approach	  of	  Howard	  and	  Downer	  was	   likely	  the	   more	   prudent	   choice.	   	   As	   Thawley	   later	   reflected,	   it	   was	   probably	   an	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unfortunate	   reality	   that	   ‘sometimes	   things	  have	  got	   to	  get	  bad,	  before	   they	  get	  worse,	  before	  they	  get	  better’.188	  	  
Australia’s	  strategic	  objectives	  after	  the	  Bali	  Summit	  For	  the	  first	  few	  months	  of	  1999,	  Australia	  played	  down	  the	  prospects	  of	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  –	  there	  was	  little	  appetite	  to	  pursue	  a	  PKF	  that	  many	  believed	  Habibie	  would	  never	  allow.	   	  It	  was	  only	  when	  the	  violence	  of	  April	  1999	  broke	  out	  that	  the	   arguments	   for	   advocating	   a	   pre-­‐ballot	   PKF	   became	   irresistible.	   	   At	   Bali,	  Howard	  pushed	  Habibie	  for	  peacekeepers	  to	  be	  deployed	  prior	  to	  the	  ballot,	  but	  this	  effort	  ceased	  when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  Habibie	  accepting	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  could	   precipitate	   a	   TNI	   coup.	   	   In	   pursuing	   the	   secondary	   objective	   of	   a	   UN	  CIVPOL	   force,	  Australia	  was	  working	   towards	  a	   free	  and	   fair	  ballot	   in	  order	   to	  support	   political	   stability	   in	   Indonesia,	  maintain	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	   and	  avoid	  an	  immediate	  Indonesian	  withdrawal	  from	  East	  Timor.	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  Michael	  Thawley,	  interview	  with	  author.	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Chapter	  6	  
Lacking	  alternatives,	  Australia	  goes	  along	  for	  the	  ride	  (May	  –	  August	  1999)	  
New	  York	  cautions	  Jakarta,	  as	  the	  UN	  puts	  boots	  on	  the	  ground	  As	  April	  drew	  to	  a	  close,	  the	  UN	  was	  concerned	  that	  in	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  violence	  in	   Liquica	   and	  Dili,	   the	   security	   arrangements	   agreed	   in	   the	  Tripartite	   process	  were	  insufficient	  –	  specifically,	  Indonesia	  had	  resisted	  the	  inclusion	  of	  references	  to	  the	  disarmament	  and	  cantonment	  of	  militias.189	  	  On	  30	  April	  Kofi	  Annan	  wrote	  to	  Habibie,	  outlining	  the	  security	  arrangements	  he	  would	  require	  to	  approve	  the	  conduct	  of	   the	  ballot.	   	  Although	  Indonesia	  refused	  to	   formally	  accept	  the	   letter,	  Marker	   felt	   that	   at	   least	   ‘our	   concerns	   had	   been	   conveyed	   in	   unmistakable	  fashion,	  to	  serve	  as	  our	  implicit	  guidelines	  for	  assessing	  security	  needs’.190	  	  With	  the	   concept	   of	   a	   pre-­‐ballot	   PKF	   now	   forfeit,	   several	   countries	   made	   similar	  fruitless	  efforts	  to	  encourage	  the	  TNI	  to	  control	  militia	  violence	  in	  East	  Timor.	  	  	  	  On	  05	  May	  1999,	  the	  Indonesian	  and	  Portuguese	  Foreign	  Ministers	  met	  in	  New	  York	  to	  sign	  the	  Tripartite	  agreements.	  	  The	  agreement	  on	  modalities	  stipulated	  that	  the	  ballot	  would	  occur	  on	  08	  August	  1999	  –	  an	  ambitious	  timeframe,	  agreed	  by	   the	   UN	   due	   to	   Habibie’s	   insistence	   that	   the	   East	   Timor	   Issue	   be	   resolved	  during	  his	  Presidency.191	  	  Given	  the	  US	  requirement	  for	  Congress	  to	  be	  consulted,	  the	   United	   Nations	   Assistance	   Mission	   in	   East	   Timor	   (UNAMET)	   was	   not	  officially	  established	  until	  11	  June	  although	  its	  head,	  Ian	  Martin,	  arrived	  in	  Dili	  on	  01	  June.192	  	  
Pressures	  on	  UNAMET’s	  timeline	  On	   07	   June,	   Indonesia	   held	   elections	   for	   the	   People’s	   Representative	   Council.	  	  These	  were	  conducted	  peacefully	  and	  without	  military	   interference	  –	  a	  notable	  achievement	  given	  Indonesia’s	  history.	   	  Habibie’s	  party	  came	  second	  by	  a	  wide	  margin	  –	  Megawati	  Sukarnoputri’s	  strong	  polling	  suggested	  she	  was	  likely	  to	  win	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  p.153.	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  CoA,	  East	  Timor	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  Transition,	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  Martin,	  Self-­‐determination	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  East	  Timor,	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the	  Presidential	  election	  in	  October.193	  	  She	  had	  openly	  criticised	  Habibie’s	  action	  on	   East	   Timor	   and	   ‘considerable	   diplomatic	   effort	   was	   put	   into	   convincing	  Megawati	  that	  she	  should	  honour	  Habibie’s	  commitments’.194	  	  Thus,	  the	  domestic	  political	  situation	  in	  Jakarta	  put	  further	  pressure	  on	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  ballot.	  As	  UNAMET	  prepared	  to	  conduct	  the	  ballot,	  conditions	  on	  the	  ground	  also	  posed	  serious	   challenges.	   	   Martin	   found	   that	   while	   the	   international	   presence	   had	   a	  calming	  effect	  in	  Dili,	  by	  June	  militia	  violence	  in	  regional	  areas	  had	  caused	  some	  40	  000	  East	  Timorese	  to	  become	  internally	  displaced.195	  	  The	  voter	  registration	  process,	  which	  was	  meant	  to	  begin	  on	  22	  June,	  was	  rescheduled	  to	  begin	  on	  16	  July.196	  
Australia	  warns	  the	  TNI	  After	   their	   failure	   to	   secure	   a	   pre-­‐ballot	   PKF	   in	   Bali—and	   following	   repeated	  denials	  that	  the	  TNI	  were	  involved	  in	  assisting	  the	  militia—Australian	  decision-­‐makers	   decided	   to	   try	   a	   new	   approach	   to	   senior	   TNI	   officers.	   	   Australian	  intelligence	  collection	  had	  revealed	  ‘a	  clear	  picture	  of	  the	  TNI-­‐militia	  linkages	  at	  [the]	   operational	   level’	   and	   on	   18	   May	   1999,	   the	   Cabinet	   authorised	   an	  Australian	   mission	   to	   Jakarta.	   	   This	   delegation	   would	   explain	   Australia’s	  knowledge	   of	   these	   links	   and	   warn	   the	   TNI	   that	   their	   covert	   activities	   would	  eventually	  become	  public	  knowledge.197	  	  	  On	  21	  June	  1999,	  the	  Vice	  Chief	  of	  the	  Australian	  Defence	  Force,	  Air	  Vice	  Marshal	  Doug	   Riding,	   delivered	   this	   message	   to	   the	   TNI’s	   Chief	   of	   Staff	   for	   Territorial	  Affairs,	   Lieutenant-­‐General	   Susilo	  Bambang	  Yudhoyono.	   	   Accompanying	  Riding	  were	   John	  McCarthy	  and	  a	   senior	  Defence	  official,	  Allan	  Behm.	   	  The	  Australian	  message	  was	  blunt	  and	  unequivocal:	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  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	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strengthening	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   Boulder	   CO:	   Lynne	   Rienner	  Publishers,	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  and	  Goldsworthy,	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In	  our	  opinion	  the	  most	  significant	  threats	  to	  a	  genuinely	  free	  ballot	  come	  from	  the	  pro-­‐integrationist	  militia	  groups,	  supported	  by	  TNI.	  	  So	  long	  as	  this	  occurs,	  Indonesia’s	  claims	  to	  be	  supporting	  a	  fair	  and	  open	  process	  will	  be	  undermined.	  	  This	  is	  very	  seriously	  damaging	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  Government	  and	  TNI.198	  McCarthy	   remembers	   this	   encounter	  as	  having	   little	   effect	  on	  Yudhoyono,	  who	  politely	   deflected	   the	   accusatory	   statements.199	  	   According	   to	   White,	   though	  Australia	   ‘knew	   quite	   a	   lot	   about	   what	   was	   happening	   on	   the	   ground	   in	   East	  Timor,	  we	  knew	  very	   little	  about	  how	  it	  was	  connected	  with	   Jakarta…we	  knew	  there	  was	  a	  connection,	  but	  we	  never	  saw	  what	  it	  was’.200	  	  Without	  proof	   of	   this	   connection—the	  proverbial	   “smoking	  gun”—the	  visit	   did	  not	   result	   in	   any	   discernable	   reduction	   in	   violence.	   	   This	   inability	   or	  unwillingness	   to	   control	   the	   violence	   leaves	   open	   the	   possibility	   that	   senior	  Generals	   such	   as	   Wiranto	   and	   Yudhoyono	   had	   not	   authorised	   the	   TNI-­‐militia	  links	   and	   were	   thus	   unable	   to	   order	   a	   halt	   to	   the	   violence.201	  	   At	   any	   rate,	  Australia’s	  ability	  to	  affect	  conditions	  on	  the	  ground	  at	  this	  point	  was	  marginal	  –	  White	  recalls	  that	  ‘we	  didn’t	  have	  very	  many	  cards	  to	  play	  in	  this	  situation’.202	  	  	  	  
Preparations	  for	  a	  PKF	  Concerned	   about	   the	   prospects	   for	   post-­‐ballot	   violence,	   in	  May	   1999	  Australia	  began	   contingency	   planning—at	   the	   UN’s	   request—for	   an	   evacuation	   of	   UN	  personnel	  from	  East	  Timor.	  	  This	  was	  named	  Operation	  Spitfire.203	  	  After	  the	  Bali	  Summit,	   some	   Australian	   decision-­‐makers	   now	   regarded	   the	   eventual	  deployment	   of	   ADF	   troops	   to	   East	   Timor	   as	   almost	   certain.204	  	   DFAT’s	   earlier	  concerns	  about	  preparations	  for	  a	  PKF	  becoming	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	  were	  now	  outweighed	  by	  the	  need	  to	  be	  ready	  for	  post-­‐ballot	  violence.	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The	   ADF	   had	   begun	   planning	   for	   a	   “Phase	   Three”	   peacekeeping	   operation	   –	   a	  force	   to	   be	   deployed	   following	   a	   ballot	   for	   independence	   and	   an	   MPR	   decree	  releasing	  East	  Timor	  from	  Indonesia.	  	  As	  this	  would	  likely	  be	  a	  UN-­‐led	  operation	  to	   be	   deployed	   once	   the	   TNI	   had	  withdrawn	   from	   East	   Timor,	   in	  March	   1999	  Australia	   appointed	   Brigadier	   Mike	   Smith	   as	   ‘Director-­‐General	   East	   Timor’.205	  	  Smith’s	  role	  was	  to	  liaise	  with	  the	  UN’s	  Department	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Operations	  in	   New	   York.206	  	   By	   July	   1999	   there	   were	   firm	   ideas	   of	   how	   Australia	   might	  contribute	  to	  a	  post-­‐ballot	  PKF	  and	  Marker	  was	  briefed	  on	  Australia’s	  ability	  to	  deploy	  two	  brigades	  under	  UN	  authority.207	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  specify	  that	  at	  this	  stage,	   these	   plans	   did	   not	   envisage	   the	   deployment	   of	   an	   Australian-­‐led	   PKF	  immediately	  after	   the	  ballot.	   	  Defence	  had	  earlier	  advised	   the	  Government	   that	  the	   ‘ADF	   lacked	   the	   resources	   to	   stabilise	   East	   Timor	   once	   it	   came	   apart’	   –	  planning	  was	  premised	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  UN-­‐led	  PKF	  in	  late	  1999.208	  In	  June	  1999	  the	  US	  Pacific	  Command	  (PACOM),	  based	  in	  Hawaii,	  requested	  that	  Australia	   assign	   liaison	   officers	   to	   participate	   in	   contingency	   planning	   for	   East	  Timor. 209 	  	   PACOM’s	   operational	   plans	   focussed	   on	   the	   US	   military	   using	  ‘overwhelming	   force’	   to	   ‘stop	   the	   killing’	   that	   might	   accompany	   or	   follow	   the	  ballot.210	  	  Clinton	  Fernandes	  has	  argued	  that	  Australia’s	  decision	  not	  to	  assist	  this	  planning	  was	  part	  of	  a	  campaign	  to	  prevent	  a	  PKF,	  but	  his	  account	  overlooks	  two	  critical	  factors.211	  	  	  Firstly,	  this	  was	  routine	  contingency	  planning	  conducted	  by	  PACOM	  –	  it	  did	  not	  illustrate	  US	  enthusiasm	  for	  a	  PKF.	   	  A	  leaked	  cable	  records	  the	  US	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  the	  Pacific,	  Admiral	  Denis	  Blair,	  specifically	  noting	  that	  it	  ‘was	  unclear	  which	  way	  Washington	  would	  jump’	  –	  PACOM’s	  work	  was	  ‘no	  more	  than	  prudent	  planning	  at	  this	  stage’.212	  	  Australia	  was	  very	  well	  aware	  of	  the	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  Smith,	   Michael	   and	   Dee,	   Moreen,	   Peacekeeping	   in	   East	   Timor,	   Boulder	   CO:	   Lynne	   Rienner	  Publishers	  Inc,	  2003,	  p.13.	  206	  Connery,	  Crisis	  Policymaking,	  pp.25-­‐26.	  	  207	  Marker,	  East	  Timor,	  pp.178-­‐179.	  208	  Hugh	   White,	   interview	   with	   author.	   	   This	   view	   was	   also	   supported	   by	   Allan	   Behm,	   in	   his	  interview	  with	  the	  author.	   	   	  See	  also	  Aylmer,	  Sean,	  ‘Timor:	  Downer	  says	  there’s	  no	  rift	  with	  US’,	  
The	  Australian	  Financial	  Review,	  02	  August	  1999	  209	  Daley,	  Paul,	  ‘US	  Marines	  Set	  For	  Dili’,	  The	  Age,	  10	  August	  1999.	  210	  Daley,	  Paul,	  ‘Downer	  Trips	  Over	  Secret	  Timor	  Cable’,	  The	  Age,	  11	  August	  1999.	  211	  See	  Fernandes,	  ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET:	  Bringing	  the	  Politics	  Back	  In’,	  pp.90-­‐91.	  212	  Daley,	  ‘Downer	  Trips	  Over	  Secret	  Timor	  Cable’.	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Hawaii	   and	  Washington	  DC	  on	   this	   issue.	   	  According	   to	  White,	  Australia	   ‘knew	  the	   Pentagon	  wasn’t	   going	   to	   buy	   this’	   –	   a	   claim	   only	   supported	   by	   America’s	  reluctance	  to	  contribute	  ground	  forces	  in	  September	  1999.213	  	  	  Secondly,	   PACOM’s	   concept	   for	   a	  PKF	   in	  East	  Timor	  was	  heavily	   influenced	  by	  the	   US	   military’s	   mid-­‐1990s	   experience	   in	   Somalia	   –	   ‘their	   force	   protection	  doctrine	   had	   gone	   right	   out	   of	   control…their	   requirements	  were	   to	   establish	   a	  citadel	   in	   the	  middle	   of	  Dili’.214	  	   This	   sentiment	  was	   supported	   by	  Moore,	  who	  was	   reluctant	   to	   sanction	  American	   leadership	  of	   a	  PKF	  –	   ‘we	  were	   concerned	  that	   they	  would	  overplay	   their	  hand	  with	   Indonesia’	  and	  that	   this	  might	  create	  long-­‐term	  problems	  for	  the	  Australia-­‐Indonesia	  relationship.215	  	  
Conflict	  in	  East	  Timor	  puts	  pressure	  on	  the	  ballot	  While	  some	  observers	  thought	  the	  peaceful	  conduct	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  elections	  demonstrated	  TNI’s	  willingness	  and	  ability	  to	  curtail	  violence,	  security	  incidents	  in	  East	  Timor	   cast	   doubt	   on	  whether	   the	  ballot	   should	  proceed.	  216	  	  Due	   to	   the	  attacks	   against	   UNAMET	   and	   the	   issue	   of	   voter	   intimidation,	   Martin	  recommended	   to	   New	   York	   that	   preparations	   for	   the	   ballot	   ‘should	   remain	  suspended	  until	  the	  Indonesian	  Government	  had	  taken	  action	  resulting	  in	  a	  clear	  improvement	   in	   the	   security	   situation’.217	  	   McCarthy,	   who	   then	   believed	   that	  proceeding	   would	   pose	   an	   unacceptable	   risk	   of	   violence,	   conveyed	   his	  supporting	  view	  to	  Canberra.218	  	  	  These	  conditions	  posed	  severe	  challenges	   for	  UNAMET,	  but	  Marker	  and	  Annan	  decided	   that	   any	   significant	   delay	   might	   threaten	   the	   entire	   process	   –	   Annan	  reported	   to	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   that	   he	   decided	   to	   progress	   with	   voter	  registration	  ‘based	  on	  positive	  assurances	  by	  the	  Indonesian	  authorities,	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  meaningful,	  visible	  improvements	  in	  the	  security	  situation	  will	  be	  observed	   in	   the	   immediate	   future’. 219 	  	   This	   course	   of	   action	   was	   strongly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Hugh	  White,	   interview	   with	   author.	   	   This	   view	   was	   also	   supported	   by	   Alexander	   Downer,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  214	  Hugh	  White,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  215	  John	  Moore,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  216	  See	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.169.	  217	  Martin,	  Self-­‐determination	  in	  East	  Timor,	  pp.48-­‐49.	  218	  John	  McCarthy,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  219	  United	  Nations,	  S/1999/786,	  14	  July	  1999.	  	  See	  also	  Marker,	  East	  Timor,	  p.176.	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supported	   by	   Australia	   –	   Downer	   believed	   that	   if	   ‘the	   militias	   on	   the	   ground	  knew	  that	  violence	  would	  stop	  the	  ballot,	  then	  they	  would	  just	  become	  more	  and	  more	  violent’.220	  	  	  	  The	  voter	  registration	  period	  began	  on	  16	  July	  1999	  –	  the	  UN	  Secretary	  General	  soon	  reported	   that	   ‘the	   first	   few	  days	  of	   registration	  have	  proceeded	  relatively	  peacefully,	  the	  East	  Timorese	  turning	  out	  to	  register	  in	  substantial	  numbers’.221	  	  	  The	  relatively	  peaceful	  conduct	  of	  the	  registration	  period	  contrasted	  with	  earlier	  violent	   incidents	   and	   raised	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   ballot	   itself	   might	   not	   be	  accompanied	   by	   significant	   violence.	   	   Interviewed	   in	   2001,	   McCarthy	   recalled	  that	  ‘things	  weren’t	  necessarily	  always	  as	  bad	  as	  you	  thought	  they	  were	  going	  to	  be…there	  was	  a	  conflicting	  flow	  of	  evidence	  as	  to	  what	  might	  happen’.222	  	  	  
Australia’s	  objectives	  –	  the	  ballot	  must	  go	  on	  Australian	  officials	  knew	  that	  any	  significant	  postponement	  of	   the	  ballot	  would	  probably	  amount	  to	  a	  cancellation	  that	  would	  destroy	  Indonesia’s	   international	  standing	   –	   a	   dire	   scenario	   for	   Australia’s	   strategic	   objectives.	   	   Since	   April,	  Australia	  had	  done	  all	  it	  could	  prudently	  do	  to	  reduce	  violence	  in	  East	  Timor	  –	  it	  had	   cautioned	   TNI	   about	   support	   for	   the	  militia	   and	   begun	   preparations	   for	   a	  post-­‐ballot	   PKF.	   	   Australian	   officials	   knew	   that	   some	   level	   of	   violence	   would	  accompany	  the	  ballot:	  closest	  to	  the	  action,	  McCarthy	  felt	  that	  there	  was	  ‘going	  to	  be	  a	  price	  paid’	  for	  self-­‐determination.223	  	  But	  considered	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  cancellation,	  achieving	  a	  relatively	  free	  and	  fair	  ballot—even	  one	  accompanied	  by	  violence—was	  seen	  as	  the	  best	  choice	  amongst	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  unpalatable	  options.	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  Alexander	  Downer,	  interview	  with	  author.	  	  	  221	  United	  Nations,	  S/1999/803,	  20	  July	  1999.	  222	  John	   McCarthy,	   interview	   with	   Paul	   Edwards,	   Oral	   History	   Section,	   National	   Library	   of	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  25	  June	  2001.	  	  Copy	  in	  author’s	  possession.	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  John	  McCarthy,	  interview	  with	  Paul	  Edwards.	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Chapter	  7	  
The	  International	  Force	  for	  East	  Timor	  (August	  –	  September	  1999)	  
A	  vote	  for	  independence	  and	  its	  consequences	  On	  30	  August	  1999,	  98.6%	  of	   those	  who	  had	  registered	   to	  vote	  participated	   in	  the	   act	   of	   self-­‐determination.224	  	  Only	   a	   few	  violent	   incidents	   occurred	   and	   the	  day	  of	  the	  ballot	  was	  surprisingly	  calm.	   	  However,	  on	  02	  and	  03	  September	  the	  security	   situation	   deteriorated	   –	   militia	   forces	   began	   to	   target	   East	   Timorese	  working	   for	   UNAMET	   and	   foreign	   journalists	   began	   to	   evacuate.225	  	   UNAMET	  decided	  to	  release	  the	  ballot	  results	  earlier	  than	  scheduled	  –	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  Saturday	  04	   September	  1999,	   the	   results	   of	   the	  ballot	  were	   announced	   in	  Dili,	  with	  a	  simultaneous	  announcement	  in	  New	  York.	  	  78.5%	  had	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  independence.226	  	  	  The	  violent	  response	  was	  immediate.	   	  Angered	  by	  the	  scale	  of	  their	  defeat,	  pro-­‐integration	  militias	  began	  to	  attack	  UNAMET	  buildings	  and	  staff	  in	  regional	  areas	  –	   at	   Liquicia	   an	   unarmed	   American	   police	   officer	   was	   shot	   three	   times.227	  	   In	  many	  cases,	  despite	  militia	  attempts	  to	  prevent	  the	  evacuation	  of	  East	  Timorese	  working	   for	   UNAMET,	   foreign	   staff	   refused	   to	   evacuate	   unless	   their	   East	  Timorese	  colleagues	  could	  accompany	   them.228	  	  As	   the	   integrationists	  began	   to	  evacuate	  for	  West	  Timor,	  they	  looted	  and	  burnt	  most	  of	  Dili	  –	  a	  UN	  spokesman	  noted	  that	  ‘the	  principal	  weapon	  was	  gasoline’.229	  
Australia’s	  conditions	  for	  a	  PKF	  The	   scale	   and	   severity	   of	   the	   violence	   shocked	   Australian	   decision-­‐makers,	  particularly	  given	  the	  relatively	  peaceful	  conduct	  of	  the	  ballot	   itself.230	  	  Howard	  and	  Downer	  called	  their	  Indonesian	  counterparts,	  insisting	  that	  the	  TNI	  needed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  224	  Edwards	  and	  Goldsworthy,	  Facing	  North,	  p.244.	  225	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.194.	  226	  United	  Nations,	  S/1999/944,	  03	  September	  1999.	  227	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.199.	  228	  Martin,	  Self-­‐determination	  in	  East	  Timor,	  p.95	  229	  Traub,	  James,	  ‘Inventing	  East	  Timor’,	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  79:4,	  2000,	  p.78.	  230	  John	  Howard,	  interview	  with	  author.	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to	  control	  the	  militias	  and	  stop	  the	  violence.231	  	  With	  Indonesia’s	  consent,	  on	  06	  September	  the	  ADF	  began	  to	  evacuate	  UNAMET’s	  non-­‐essential	  staff	  from	  Dili	  –	  
Operation	  Spitfire	  had	  begun.232	  	  	  Howard	  spent	  most	  of	  Monday	  06	  September	  on	  the	  phone.	   	  Kofi	  Annan	  called	  and	  asked	  if	  Australia	  was	  willing	  and	  able	  to	   lead	  a	  multi-­‐national	  PKF	  in	  East	  Timor.	   	   As	   White	   has	   noted,	   ‘this	   was	   not	   a	   task	   for	   which	   Australia	   had	  specifically	   prepared’:	   ‘planning	   for	   this	   hadn’t	   crossed	   our	  mind,	   because	   we	  reached	  the	  judgement	  that	  we	  couldn’t	  do	  it’.233	  	  Nevertheless,	  Howard	  affirmed	  to	   Annan	   that	   Australia	   was	   ready	   to	   lead	   only	   if	   Indonesia	   consented	   to	   the	  insertion	   of	   a	   PKF.	   	   Howard	   called	   Habibie	   and	   suggested	   he	   admit	   an	  international	  force	  to	  restore	  order	  in	  East	  Timor,	  but	  Habibie	  resisted.	  	  He	  told	  Howard	   that	   he	   would	   declare	   martial	   law,	   but	   that	   if	   this	   failed	   to	   stop	   the	  violence	  then	  he	  would	  invite	  an	  international	  PKF	  to	  restore	  security.234	  At	  an	  NSCC	  meeting	  on	  07	  September	  1999,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  an	  Australian-­‐led	  PKF	  would	  require:	  	  
• strong	  Asian	  participation,	  	  
• clear	  American	  support,	  including	  a	  security	  guarantee,	  	  
• Indonesian	  consent235,	  and	  
• a	   robust	   mandate,	   authorising	   the	   PKF	   to	   take	   “all	   necessary	   means”	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.	  236	  
Regional	  support	  DFAT	  and	  Defence	  wasted	  no	  time	  in	  securing	  South-­‐East	  Asian	  commitment	  to	  the	   operation	   and	   soon	   ‘obtained	   early	   expressions	   of	   support…from	   the	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  Howard,	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  author.	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  CoA,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition,	  p.130.	  233	  White,	   ‘The	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   INTERFET’,	   p.82.	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   second	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   is	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  author.	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Philippines,	   Thailand,	   Singapore,	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Malaysia’. 237 	  	   Given	   the	  Association	   of	   South-­‐East	   Asian	   Nations	   (ASEAN)	   norm	   of	   “non-­‐interference”,	  this	   was	   an	   encouraging	   result	   for	   Australian	   planners.238	  	   Although	   not	   all	   of	  these	  expressions	  of	  support	  translated	  into	  troop	  commitments,	  the	  willingness	  of	  Thailand	  to	  quickly	  commit	  over	  1	  600	  troops—as	  well	  as	  INTERFET’s	  Deputy	  Commander—was	   key	   in	   ensuring	   the	   force	   had	   strong	   regional	  representation.239 	  	   Importantly,	   this	   ‘diluted	   the	   impression	   that	   it	   was	   an	  Australian	  vs	  Indonesian	  confrontation’.240	  
American	  support	  as	  Indonesia	  consents	  In	  a	  discussion	  with	  US	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  on	  Monday	  06	  September,	  Howard	  asked	   for	   an	   American	   military	   contribution	   to	   a	   PKF.	   	   Howard	   specifically	  requested	   ‘ground	   troops’,	   but	   Clinton—citing	   commitments	   in	   the	   Balkans—	  declined	   to	   provide	   this	   support.241 	  	   Clinton’s	   inability	   to	   provide	   a	   quick	  contribution	  of	  ground	   forces	  shocked	  Howard	  –	   ‘it	   really	  brought	  home	  to	  me	  how	  much	  of	  a	  peace	  dividend	  they	  had	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War’.242	  	  This	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  Howard	  –	  ‘we	  all	  felt	  a	  bit	  sort	  of	  alone	  on	  it…it	  was	  a	  surprise	  when	  he	  said	  no	  to	  boots	  on	  the	  ground’.243	  	  Initially,	   the	   military	   decision-­‐makers	   in	   Washington	   DC	   were	   determined	   to	  avoid	  US	   involvement.	   	   John	  Moore	  called	   the	  US	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  William	  Cohen,	  and	  requested	  only	  a	   limited	  commitment—‘a	  ship,	   a	  plane,	   at	   the	  very	  least’—to	  demonstrate	  US	  support.	  	  Cohen	  relayed	  the	  Washington	  DC	  view	  that	  the	  US	  wouldn’t	  be	  supporting	  INTERFET.	  	  Moore	  replied	  ‘well,	  so	  much	  for	  the	  ANZUS	  treaty’.244	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  John	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   interview	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  author.	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  an	   interview	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  author.	  	  	  244	  John	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   interview	   with	   author.	   	   ANZUS—a	   security	   treaty	   between	   Australia,	   New	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These	  difficulties	  continued	  for	  several	  days:	  on	  Tuesday	  07	  September,	  Downer	  publicly	   berated	   the	   Clinton	   administration,	   commenting	   that	   ‘it	   has	   been	  enormously	  difficult	  to	  get	  the	  Americans	  to	  give	  us	  any	  commitments	  on	  troops	  and	   logistics	   support…Australians	   would	   be	   very	   disappointed	   if	   the	   United	  States	  decided	   against	   participating’.245	  	   This	   elicited	   a	  quick	   reaction	   from	   the	  US	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   Madeline	   Albright,	   who	   rang	   Downer	   to	   express	   her	  displeasure	   at	   his	   comments.246 	  	   Clinton’s	   National	   Security	   Adviser,	   Sandy	  Berger,	  also	  aggravated	  the	  issue	  by	  comparing	  the	  situation	  in	  East	  Timor	  to	  his	  daughter’s	   messy	   room	   –	   some	   perceived	   this	   as	   ‘a	   very	   sharp	   reminder	   to	  Australia	   that	  when	  the	  chips	  are	  down,	  you	  cannot	  always	  automatically	  bank	  on	   the	   USA’.247	  	   For	   these	   few	   days,	   at	   the	   political	   level,	   the	   intimacy	   of	   the	  Australia-­‐US	  relationship	  was	  at	  significant	  risk.	  	  	  Australia’s	  leaders	  had	  hoped	  for	  a	  rapid	  commitment	  of	  American	  ground	  forces	  for	   ‘the	   symbolism	   of	   their	   direct	   involvement’,248	  but	  Howard’s	   initial	   request	  was	  the	  wrong	  approach	  given	  America’s	  military	  commitments	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  	  Perhaps	  more	  significantly,	   it	  was	  also	  not	  what	   the	  ADF	  required	  –	  Australian	  defence	   officials	   were	   not	   concerned	   about	   a	   ground	   force	   contribution,	   but	  rather	   transport,	   logistical	   assistance,	   intelligence	   support	   and—most	  importantly—the	  promise	  of	  an	  American	  security	  guarantee.	  	  These	  supporting	  elements	  were	  agreed	  in	  a	  teleconference	  on	  Wednesday	  08	  September,	  enabling	  Clinton	   to	   ring	   Howard	   and	   commit	   to	   the	   PKF,	   which	   would	   be	   called	   the	  International	  Force	  for	  East	  Timor	  (INTERFET).249	  	  	  Although	   Downer	   and	   Howard	   were	   dissatisfied	   that	   it	   took	   several	   days	   to	  reach	  this	  point,	  from	  the	  US	  perspective	  this	  was	  a	  ‘highly	  accelerated	  decision-­‐making	   process’.250	  	   Having	   decided	   to	   throw	   their	   support	   behind	   Australia’s	  efforts	   to	   secure	   a	   PKF,	   the	   US	   now	   moved	   to	   amplify	   the	   diplomatic	   and	  financial	  pressure	  on	  Jakarta.	   	  On	  Friday	  10	  September,	  as	  Clinton	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an	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   Economic	   Cooperation	   (APEC)	   forum	   meeting	   in	   Auckland,	   he	  called	   for	   Indonesia	   to	  accept	  a	  PKF:	   ‘if	   Indonesia	  does	  not	  end	   the	  violence,	   it	  must	   invite—it	  must	   invite—the	   international	   community	   to	   assist	   in	   restoring	  security’.251	  	  He	  also	  alluded	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Indonesia’s	  economic	  future	  was	  still	  dependent	   on	   IMF	   funding	   –	   if	   Indonesia	   refused	   a	   PKF	   there	   would	   be	  ‘overwhelming	   public	   sentiment	   to	   stop	   the	   international	   economic	  cooperation’.252	  	  By	  the	  time	  Clinton	  arrived	  in	  Auckland	  for	  APEC,	  he	  and	  Howard	  were	  united	  in	  their	   message:	   Indonesia	   must	   consent	   to	   an	   international	   PKF	   or	   face	   the	  economic	  consequences.	   	  Although	  the	  East	  Timor	  situation	  was	  not	  technically	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  APEC	  agenda,	  an	  informal	  meeting	  of	  Foreign	  Ministers	  enabled	   concerned	   countries	   to	   voice	   their	   support	   for	   a	  PKF.253	  	  This	  meeting	  ‘galvanised	  support	  for	  intervention,	  and	  demonstrated	  to	  Indonesia	  the	  concern	  of	  its	  ASEAN	  colleagues	  over	  events	  in	  East	  Timor’.254	  	  By	   this	   time,	   Australian	   decision-­‐makers	   believed	   that	   Wiranto	   was	   likely	  responsible	   for	   Indonesia’s	   continued	   refusal	   to	   admit	   a	   PKF:	   the	   extent	   of	  Habibie’s	  authority—particularly	  his	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  TNI—was	  unclear.	   	  It	  was	  decided	  that	  Allan	  Behm	  would	  approach	  a	  TNI	  colleague	  and	  request	  that	  they	   pass	   a	   message	   to	   Wiranto	   -­‐	   the	   UN	   had	   started	   to	   talk	   about	   possible	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  in	  East	  Timor.255	  	  This	  message	  reached	  Wiranto	  as	  he	  flew	   out	   to	   East	   Timor,	   accompanied	   by	   an	   observer	   mission	   from	   the	   UN	  Security	  Council	  (UNSC).	   	  The	  UNSC	  report	  suggests	  that	  as	  Wiranto	  toured	  Dili	  his	  views	  changed,	  perhaps	  because	  ‘he	  had	  not	  been	  prepared	  for	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  destruction’.256	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As	   Wiranto	   returned	   to	   Jakarta,	   the	   ‘extraordinary	   crescendo	   of	   diplomatic	  pressure’	   on	   Indonesia	   came	   to	   its	   zenith.257 	  	   Isolated	   in	   the	   international	  community,	   Indonesia	   faced	   financial	   Armageddon:	   the	   rupiah	   had	   slipped	  significantly	  against	  the	  US	  dollar	  and	  there	  was	  a	  very	  real	  prospect	  of	  punitive	  financial	   action.258 	  	   With	   no	   further	   room	   for	   Indonesian	   recalcitrance,	   on	  Sunday	   12	   September	   1999	   Habibie	   requested	   that	   the	   UN	   provide	   a	   PKF	   for	  East	  Timor.	  
Finalising	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  and	  deploying	  INTERFET	  With	  Indonesia	  having	  signalled	  its	  willingness	  to	  accept	  a	  PKF,	  work	  began	  on	  the	  text	  of	  a	  UNSC	  resolution.	   	  Although	  Indonesia	  would	  have	  preferred	  a	   less	  authoritative	  Chapter	  VI	  mandate,	  the	  resolution	  passed	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  UN	   Charter.259	  	   The	   PKF	   was	   tasked	   to	   ‘restore	   peace	   and	   security	   in	   East	  Timor…protect	  and	  support	  UNAMET…[and]	  facilitate	  humanitarian	  assistance’:	  importantly,	   the	   Chapter	   VII	   resolution	   allowed	   the	   PKF	   to	   ‘take	   all	   necessary	  measures	  to	  fulfil	  this	  mandate’.260	  Australia’s	   final	  deployment	  condition	  required	  the	  TNI	  to	  understand	  that	  any	  opposition	   to	   the	   deployment	   would	   attract	   the	   wrath	   of	   the	   US	   military.	  	  Although	   Paul	   Kelly	   claims	   that	   Cohen	   visited	   Jakarta	   on	   the	   ‘eve	   of	   the	  operation’	   to	  warn	  that	   the	   ‘deployment	  must	  not	  be	  contested’,	   this	  cannot	  be	  independently	  corroborated.261	  	  On	  16	  September,	  the	  Vice	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  met	  with	  General	  Yudhoyono	  and	  emphasised	  the	  need	  for	  the	  ‘full	  cooperation	   of	   the	   Indonesian	  military’.262	  	   Closer	   to	   East	   Timor,	   this	  message	  was	   reinforced	  by	   the	  presence	  of	  Admiral	  Blair’s	   command	  ship,	   the	  USS	  Blue	  
Ridge,	  which	   was	   positioned	   in	   the	   Pacific	   Ocean.	   	   It	   seems	   likely	   that	   when	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  257	  Martin,	   Ian	   and	   Mayer-­‐Rieckh,	   Alexander,	   ‘The	   United	   Nations	   and	   East	   Timor:	   from	   self-­‐determination	  to	  state-­‐building’,	  International	  Peacekeeping,	  12:1,	  2005,	  p.131.	  258	  See	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees,	  Deliverance,	  p.260.	  259	  See	  Martin,	  Self-­‐determination	  in	  East	  Timor,	  pp.113-­‐114.	  260	  United	  Nations,	  S/RES/1264,	  15	  September	  1999	  261	  Kelly,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots,	  p.511.	  	  Archived	  records	  suggest	  that	  Cohen	  was	  in	  the	  US	  during	  the	   week	   immediately	   preceding	   the	   deployment	   of	   INTERFET	   –	   see	   Cohen,	   William,	   News	  
Advisories,	  at	  http://tinyurl.com/cohenarchive	  [accessed	  11	  June	  2012].	   	  See	  also	  Cohen/Moore	  Joint	   Press	   Briefing,	   29	   September	   1999,	   at	   http://tinyurl.com/cohenmoore	   [accessed	   15	  May	  2012].	  262	  Becker,	  Elizabeth,	   ‘U.S.	  and	  Indonesian	  Generals	  Discuss	  Safety	  of	  Troops	  in	  Timor’,	  The	  New	  
York	  Times,	  16	  September	  1999.	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Cohen	  visited	  Jakarta	  in	  late	  September,	  he	  delivered	  the	  more	  explicit	  warning	  to	  the	  TNI	  leadership	  that	  INTERFET	  must	  not	  be	  contested.263	  	  	  	  Australia’s	   four	  conditions	  had	  been	  met;	  all	   that	  now	  remained	  was	   to	  deploy	  INTERFET	  to	  East	  Timor.	   	  The	  commander,	  Major-­‐General	  Peter	  Cosgrove,	   flew	  to	   Dili	   on	   19	   September	   to	   discuss	   the	   entry	   of	   INTERFET	   with	   his	   TNI	  counterpart.	  	  This	  was	  a	  period	  of	  significant	  tension	  in	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  –	  only	  days	  earlier,	  Indonesia	  had	  abrogated	  the	  Australia-­‐Indonesia	  Agreement	  on	   Maintaining	   Security	   due	   to	   the	   ‘attitude	   and	   actions	   of	   Australia	   on	   the	  questions	  of	  East	  Timor’.264	  	  It	  was	  agreed	  that	  instead	  of	  a	  helicopter	  insertion,	  which	  might	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  unintended	  conflict,	  the	  first	  Australian	  troops	  would	   arrive	   in	   Dili	   on	   Hercules	   transport	   aircraft.265	  	   On	   20	   September	   1999	  INTERFET	  deployed	  1	  500	  troops	  to	  Dili,	  beginning	  a	  new	  chapter	  in	  the	  history	  of	  East	  Timor.266	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  264	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  p.145.	  	  265	  Garran	  and	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  p.274.	  266	  The	  operational	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  of	  INTERFET	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  outside	  the	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  of	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  study.	  	  Interested	  readers	  will	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  that	  Deliverance	  by	  Garran	  and	  Greenlees	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  an	  excellent	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  For	  a	  more	  detailed	   account,	   see	   Breen,	   Bob,	  Mission	   Accomplished,	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   Australian	   Defence	   Force	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  International	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  &	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  2000.	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Conclusion	  
Accounts	   that	   ascribe	   Australia’s	   actions	   during	   this	   period	   to	   a	   deliberate	  strategy—intended	  to	  either	  achieve	  or	  prevent	  East	  Timorese	  independence—are	   a	   disservice.	   	   By	   neglecting	   to	   examine	   the	   reactive	   nature	   of	   Australia’s	  strategic	   policy	   throughout	   this	   period,	   these	   perspectives	   fail	   to	   acknowledge	  the	   unique	   pressures,	   constraints	   and	   challenges	   faced	   by	  Australian	   decision-­‐makers.	  	  
Amidst	  notable	  failures,	  some	  oft-­‐overlooked	  successes	  Although	   Australia	   failed	   to	   achieve	   several	   of	   its	   strategic	   objectives—most	  prominently	   its	   late	   1998	   goal	   to	   ensure	   East	   Timor’s	   incorporation	   into	  Indonesia	   and	   its	   early	   1999	   desire	   to	   use	   diplomatic	  means	   to	   avoid	   an	   ADF	  deployment—this	  performance	  must	  be	  considered	  against	  the	  limited	  strategic	  options	  available	  to	  Australia.	   	  Developments	  in	  East	  Timor	  were	  driven	  largely	  by	  Jakarta	  and	  were—to	  a	  significant	  degree—beyond	  Australia’s	  influence.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  Howard	  Letter	  unintentionally	  spurred	  Habibie	  along	  the	  path	  to	  independence,	   the	   limited	   consultation	   process	   must	   be	   seen	   as	   one	   of	  Australia’s	  mistakes	  in	  this	  period.	  	  A	  wider,	  more	  contemplative	  discussion	  may	  have	  resulted	  in	  another	  option—such	  as	  an	  informal	  Ambassadorial	  approach,	  followed	  by	  a	  letter—being	  pursued.	   	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  place	  significant	  blame	  on	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  Howard	  Letter.	  	  Habibie’s	  January	  1999	  decision	  was	  bold	   and	   impetuous	   –	   it	   simply	   could	   not	   have	   been	   reasonably	   anticipated.	  	  Given	  his	  mid-­‐1998	  offer	  of	  a	  special	  status,	   it	   is	  also	  possible	   that	   the	  Howard	  Letter	   may	   have	   only	   accelerated	   Habibie’s	   seemingly	   inevitable	   decision	   to	  allow	  self-­‐determination.	  	  	  While	  Hugh	  White	  has	  correctly	  argued	  that	  Australia	  could	  have	  done	  more	  to	  support	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   pre-­‐ballot	   PKF	   in	   the	   Tripartite	   agreements,	   it	   is	  doubtful	  that	  this	  approach	  would	  have	  been	  successful.	  	  Beyond	  the	  constraints	  posed	   by	   the	   Indonesian	   Presidential	   election	   schedule	   and	   the	   international	  focus	   on	   the	   Balkans,	   a	   strenuous	   effort	   for	   peacekeepers	   would	   have	   also	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entailed	   serious	   risks	   –	   it	   could	   have	   increased	   the	   likelihood	   of	   civil-­‐military	  instability	  in	  Jakarta	  and	  endangered	  Australia’s	  primary	  strategic	  objectives.	  	  	  	  At	   the	  Bali	   Summit	  Howard	  pushed	  Habibie	   for	   peacekeepers	   to	   supervise	   the	  ballot,	   but	   conceded	   when	   Habibie	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   he	   was	   unable—from	   a	  political	   and	   civil-­‐military	   relations	   perspective—to	   accept	   a	   PKF.	   	   This	  abandoned	  push	  for	  a	  pre-­‐ballot	  PKF	  may	  have	  helped	  Australia	  in	  securing	  the	  increased	   UN	   CIVPOL	   presence	   in	   East	   Timor,	   which	   substantially	   assisted	   in	  ensuring	   the	   integrity	  of	   the	  ballot.	   	  Throughout	  1999,	   this	  need	   for	  a	   free	  and	  fair	   ballot	  was	   responsibly	  balanced	   against	   competing	  objectives	   –	   to	  prevent	  civil-­‐military	  instability	  in	  Jakarta	  and	  to	  maintain	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	  The	  worst-­‐case	   outcome—a	   fraudulent	   or	   cancelled	   ballot,	   with	   its	   attendant	  consequences	  for	  Indonesia,	  Australia	  and	  East	  Timor—was	  avoided.	  	  	  	  Australia’s	   pursuit	   of	   a	   post-­‐ballot	   PKF	   was	   conducted	   in	   a	   measured	   and	  responsible	  manner.	   	   Although	   this	   was	   a	   precarious	   situation,	   with	   Habibie’s	  authority	   uncertain,	   Australia,	   the	   US	   and	   the	   UN	   carefully	   coerced	   Indonesia	  into	   inviting	   the	   UN	   to	   assemble	   a	   PKF	   to	   restore	   security	   in	   East	   Timor.	  	  Australia’s	   engagement	   with	   South-­‐East	   Asia	   was	   energetic	   and	   impressive,	  dispelling	   doubts	   that	   the	   Howard	   Government	   would	   struggle	   where	  predecessors	  had	  excelled.	  	  Australia	   eventually	   secured	  US	   support	   for	   INTERFET	  and	  deployed	   the	   force	  without	   incident,	   but	   this	   instance	   provides	   a	   cautionary	   case	   study	   of	   how	  Australian	   decision-­‐makers	   should	   approach	   the	   alliance	   relationship.	   	   US	  military	  assistance—particularly	  when	  requested	  at	  short	  notice—should	  not	  be	  taken	   for	   granted.	   	   It	  must	   be	   remembered	   that	   the	   distance	   between	   PACOM	  and	  the	  Pentagon	  is	  significant,	  with	  the	  latter	  being	  far	  more	  connected	  to—and	  constrained	  by—the	  prevailing	  political	  sentiment	  in	  Washington	  DC.	  	  Although	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  with	  Indonesia	  was	  severely	  damaged	  by	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue	  and	  remained	  strained	  for	  several	  years,	  it	  was	  not	  completely	  torn	  asunder	  by	  the	  deployment	  of	  INTERFET.	  	  This	  may	  seem	  a	  low	  benchmark,	  but	  when	   considered	   against	   the	   real	   possibility	   of	   inadvertent	   escalation	   and	  military	  conflict	  as	   INTERFET	  deployed,	   it	   is	  actually	  a	  significant	  achievement.	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Although	  Australia	  may	  not	  have	  achieved	   its	  1998	  objective	  of	   solidifying	  and	  strengthening	   the	   bilateral	   relationship,	   given	   the	   events	   of	   1999	   the	  preservation	  of	  the	  basic	  relationship	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  success.	  
On	  balance,	  a	  sound	  strategic	  performance	  Australia’s	   failure	  to	  achieve	  several	  strategic	  objectives	   in	  1998	  and	  1999	  was	  not	  due	  to	  recklessness,	  negligence	  or	  incompetence.	  	  Rather,	  from	  January	  1999	  onwards,	   Indonesia’s	  actions	  often	  placed	  Australia	   in	  difficult	  positions,	  where	  reactions	   were	   required	   but	   strategic	   policy	   choices	   were	   limited.	   	   Critical	  objectives,	   such	   as	   Indonesia’s	   stability	   and	   democratic	   progress,	   were	  threatened	   by	   events	   that	   were	   essentially	   beyond	   Australia’s	   control	   or	  influence.	  	  	  Any	   evaluation	   of	   Australia’s	   strategic	   policy	   throughout	   this	   period	   must	  consider	  that	  from	  January	  1999	  onwards,	  developments	  were	  driven	  largely	  by	  decisions	  in	  Jakarta,	  not	  Canberra.	  	  Although	  Australia	  often	  found	  itself	  playing	  second	  fiddle	  to	  Habibie,	  strategic	  policy	  throughout	  this	  period	  was	  sound	  –	  the	  most	   important	   objectives	   were	   prioritised	   appropriately	   and	   worst-­‐case	  outcomes	  avoided.	   	  This	   is	   the	  real	   story	  of	   the	  East	  Timor	   Issue.	   	   It	  might	  not	  have	   the	  romance	  of	  a	  covert	  plan	   to	  achieve	  East	  Timorese	   independence—or	  the	  Machiavellian	  undertones	  of	  a	  plot	  to	  prevent	   it—but	  this	  study	  has	  shown	  that	   in	   a	   series	   of	   very	   difficult	   and	   high-­‐stakes	   situations,	   Australia	   probably	  achieved	  all	  it	  could.	  	  	  
	   54	  
Bibliography	  
Interviews	  and	  speeches	  	  





Relevant	  position	  in	  1998-­‐1999	  	  Paul	  Barratt	   Secretary	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Defence	  	  Chris	  Barrie	   Chief	  of	  the	  Australian	  Defence	  Force	  	  Allan	  Behm	   First	  Assistant	  Secretary,	  International	  Policy	  Division,	  Department	  of	  Defence	  	  John	  Dauth	   Deputy	  Secretary,	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  	  Alexander	  Downer	   Foreign	  Minister	  	  Tim	  Fischer	   Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  	  John	  Howard	   Prime	  Minister	  	  John	  McCarthy	   Australian	  Ambassador	  to	  Indonesia	  	  John	  Moore	   Defence	  Minister	  	  Michael	  Thawley	   International	  Adviser	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  John	  Howard	  	  Peter	  Varghese	   First	  Assistant	  Secretary,	  International	  Division,	  Department	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Cabinet	  	  Hugh	  White	   Deputy	  Secretary,	  Strategy	  and	  Intelligence,	  Department	  of	  Defence	  	  <identity	  withheld>	   Former	  senior	  Australian	  Government	  official	  intimately	  involved	  in	  the	  East	  Timor	  Issue	  	  	  Downer,	  Alexander,	  A	  Long	  Term	  Commitment:	  Australia	  and	  East	  Asia,	  Speech	  to	  the	  Indonesian	  Council	  on	  World	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Indonesia-­‐Australia	  Business	  Council,	  09	  July	  1998,	  at	  http://tinyurl.com/downerspeech1	  [accessed	  15	  May	  2012].	  	  
	   55	  
Howard,	  John,	  ‘Reflections	  on	  the	  Australia-­‐United	  States	  Alliance’,	  Speech	  to	  the	  
United	  States	  Study	  Centre	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Sydney,	  15	  February	  2011,	  at	  http://tinyurl.com/howardspeech1	  	  [accessed	  15	  May	  2012].	  	  McCarthy,	  John,	  interview	  with	  Edwards,	  Paul,	  Oral	  History	  Section,	  National	  Library	  of	  Australia,	  25	  June	  2001.	  	  Copy	  in	  author’s	  possession.	  
	  
Books	  and	  Journal	  Articles	  	  Alatas,	  Ali,	  The	  Pebble	  in	  the	  Shoe:	  the	  Diplomatic	  Struggle	  for	  East	  Timor,	  Jakarta:	  Aksara	  Karunia,	  2006.	  	  Ball,	  Desmond,	  ‘Silent	  witness:	  Australian	  intelligence	  and	  East	  Timor’,	  The	  
Pacific	  Review,	  14:1,	  2001,	  pp.	  35-­‐62.	  	  Bell,	  Coral,	  ‘East	  Timor,	  Canberra	  and	  Washington:	  A	  Case	  Study	  in	  Crisis	  Management’,	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  54:2,	  2000,	  pp.	  171-­‐176.	  	  Birmingham,	  John,	  ‘Appeasing	  Jakarta	  –	  Australia’s	  Complicity	  in	  the	  East	  Timor	  Tragedy’,	  Quarterly	  Essay,	  2,	  2001.	  	  	  	  	  Breen,	  Bob,	  Mission	  Accomplished,	  East	  Timor:	  Australian	  Defence	  Force	  
participation	  in	  the	  International	  Forces	  East	  Timor	  (INTERFET),	  Crows	  Nest	  NSW:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  2000.	  	  Burchill,	  Scott,	  ‘East	  Timor,	  Australia	  and	  Indonesia’,	  Bulletin	  of	  Concerned	  Asian	  
Scholars,	  32:1-­‐2,	  2000,	  pp.	  59-­‐65.	  	  Candio,	  Patrick	  and	  Bleiker,	  Ronald,	  ‘Peacebuilding	  in	  East	  Timor’,	  The	  Pacific	  
Review,	  14:1,	  2001,	  pp.	  63-­‐84.	  	  Chauvel,	  Richard,	  ‘The	  Centrality	  of	  the	  Periphery:	  Australia,	  Indonesia	  and	  Papua’,	  in	  John	  Monfries	  (ed),	  Different	  Societies,	  Shared	  Futures:	  Australia,	  
Indonesia	  and	  the	  Region,	  Singapore:	  ISEAS	  Publications,	  2006,	  pp.	  106-­‐125.	  	  Connery,	  David,	  Crisis	  Policymaking:	  Australia	  and	  the	  East	  Timor	  crisis	  of	  1999,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  ANU	  E	  Press,	  2010.	  	  Cotton,	  James,	  ‘Against	  the	  Grain:	  The	  East	  Timor	  Intervention’,	  Survival,	  43:1,	  Spring	  2001,	  pp.	  127-­‐142.	  	  Cotton,	  James	  (ed),	  East	  Timor	  and	  Australia:	  AIIA	  Contributions	  to	  the	  Policy	  
Debate,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Australian	  Defence	  Studies	  Centre,	  1999.	  	  Cotton,	  James,	  East	  Timor,	  Australia	  and	  the	  Regional	  Order:	  Intervention	  and	  its	  
aftermath	  in	  Southeast	  Asia,	  Oxon:	  Routledge,	  2004.	  	  Cotton,	  James,	  ‘“Peacekeeping”	  in	  East	  Timor:	  An	  Australian	  Policy	  Departure’,	  
Australian	  Journal	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  53:3,	  1999,	  pp.	  237-­‐246.	  
	   56	  
	  Cristalis,	  Irena,	  East	  Timor:	  A	  Nation’s	  Bitter	  Dawn,	  London:	  Zed	  Books	  Ltd,	  2009.	  	  Dee,	  Moreen,	  ‘“Coalitions	  of	  the	  willing”	  and	  humanitarian	  intervention:	  Australia’s	  involvement	  with	  INTERFET’,	  International	  Peacekeeping,	  8:3,	  2001,	  pp.	  1-­‐20.	  	  Dibb,	  Paul	  and	  Hale,	  David	  and	  Prince,	  Peter,	  ‘Asia’s	  Insecurity’,	  Survival,	  41:3,	  Autumn	  1999,	  pp.	  5-­‐20.	  	  Dunn,	  James,	  East	  Timor:	  a	  rough	  passage	  to	  independence,	  Double	  Bay	  NSW:	  Longueville	  Books,	  2003.	  	  Dupont,	  Alan,	  ‘ASEAN’s	  Response	  to	  the	  East	  Timor	  Crisis’,	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Affairs,	  54:2,	  2000,	  pp.	  163-­‐170.	  	  Edwards,	  Peter	  and	  Goldsworthy,	  David,	  Facing	  North:	  a	  century	  of	  Australian	  
engagement	  with	  Asia,	  Melbourne	  VIC:	  Melbourne	  University	  Press,	  2004.	  	  Fischer,	  Tim,	  Ballot	  and	  bullets:	  seven	  days	  in	  East	  Timor,	  St	  Leonards	  NSW:	  Allen	  and	  Unwin,	  2000.	  	  Fernandes,	  Clinton,	  Reluctant	  Saviour	  -­‐	  Australia,	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Independence	  
of	  East	  Timor,	  Melbourne	  VIC:	  Scribe	  Publications,	  2004.	  	  Fernandes,	  Clinton,	  The	  Independence	  of	  East	  Timor,	  Eastbourne:	  Sussex	  Academic	  Press,	  2011.	  	  Fernandes,	  Clinton,	  ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET:	  Bringing	  the	  Politics	  Back	  In’,	  
Security	  Challenges,	  4:3,	  Spring	  2008,	  pp.	  83-­‐98.	  	  Gorajo,	  Paulo,	  ‘Japan’s	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  East	  Timor,	  1975-­‐2002’,	  Asian	  Survey,	  42:5,	  Sep-­‐Oct	  2002,	  pp.	  754-­‐771.	  	  Greenlees,	  Don	  and	  Garran,	  Robert,	  Deliverance:	  the	  inside	  story	  of	  East	  Timor’s	  
fight	  for	  freedom,	  Crows	  Nest	  NSW:	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  2002.	  	  Gyngell,	  Allan	  and	  Wesley,	  Michael,	  Making	  Australian	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Port	  Melbourne	  VIC:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  	  Harrison,	  Brian,	  ‘Oral	  History	  and	  Recent	  Political	  History’,	  Oral	  History,	  1:3,	  1972,	  pp.	  30-­‐48.	  	  	  Henry,	  Iain,	  ‘Civil-­‐Military	  Relations	  in	  Post-­‐Suharto	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Implications	  for	  Democracy	  Today:	  A	  Preliminary	  Analysis’,	  Australian	  Army	  
Journal,	  2:2,	  Autumn	  2005,	  pp.	  149-­‐159.	  	  Hood,	  Ludovic,	  ‘Security	  sector	  reform	  in	  East	  Timor,	  1999-­‐2004’,	  International	  
Peacekeeping,	  13:1,	  2006,	  pp.	  60-­‐77.	  
	   57	  
	  Howard,	  John,	  Lazarus	  Rising,	  Sydney	  NSW:	  HarperCollinsPublishers,	  2010.	  	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  Indonesia’s	  Shaky	  Transition,	  Jakarta:	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  1999.	  	  Ishizuka,	  Katsumi,	  ‘Australia’s	  policy	  towards	  East	  Timor’,	  The	  Round	  Table,	  93:374,	  2004,	  pp.	  271-­‐285.	  	  Jonsson,	  Gabriel	  (ed),	  East	  Timor	  –	  Nationbuilding	  in	  the	  21st	  Century,	  Stockholm:	  Center	  for	  Pacific	  Asia	  Studies,	  2002.	  	  Kelly,	  Paul,	  March	  of	  the	  Patriots	  –	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Modern	  Australia,	  Melbourne	  VIC:	  Melbourne	  University	  Press,	  2009.	  	  	  	  Kingsbury,	  Damien	  (ed),	  Guns	  and	  Ballot	  Boxes	  –	  East	  Timor’s	  vote	  for	  
independence,	  Monash	  VIC:	  Monash	  Asia	  Institute,	  2000.	  	  Kingsbury,	  Damien,	  Power	  Politics	  and	  the	  Indonesian	  Military,	  London:	  RoutledgeCurzon,	  2003.	  	  Kingsbury,	  Damien,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Indonesia,	  South	  Melbourne	  VIC:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002.	  	  Leaver,	  Richard,	  ‘Introduction:	  Australia,	  East	  Timor	  and	  Indonesia’,	  The	  Pacific	  
Review,	  14:1,	  pp.	  1-­‐14.	  	  Leaver,	  Richard,	  ‘The	  meanings,	  origins	  and	  implications	  of	  the	  “Howard	  Doctrine”’,	  The	  Pacific	  Review,	  14:1,	  pp.	  15-­‐34.	  	  Liddle,	  R.	  William,	  ‘Indonesia	  in	  1999:	  Democracy	  Restored’,	  Asian	  Survey,	  40:1,	  2000,	  pp.32-­‐42.	  	  MacIntyre,	  Andrew	  and	  Ramage,	  Douglas,	  Seeing	  Indonesia	  as	  a	  normal	  country:	  
Implications	  for	  Australia,	  Barton	  ACT:	  Australian	  Strategic	  Policy	  Institute,	  2008.	  	  Mackie,	  Jamie,	  Australia	  and	  Indonesia:	  Current	  Problems…Future	  Prospects,	  Sydney	  NSW:	  Lowy	  Institute	  for	  International	  Policy,	  2007.	  	  Majumdar,	  Munmun,	  Indonesian	  and	  Australian	  Policy	  in	  South-­‐East	  Asia,	  Delhi:	  Academic	  Excellence,	  2003.	  	  Maley,	  William,	  ‘Australia	  and	  the	  East	  Timor	  Crisis:	  Some	  Critical	  Comments’,	  
Australian	  Journal	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  54:2,	  2000,	  pp.	  151-­‐161.	  	  Maley,	  William,	  ‘The	  UN	  and	  East	  Timor’,	  Pacifica	  Review,	  12:1,	  2000,	  pp.	  63-­‐76.	  	  Marker,	  Jamsheed,	  East	  Timor:	  A	  Memoir	  of	  the	  Negotiations	  for	  Independence,	  North	  Carolina:	  McFarland	  &	  Company,	  Inc.,	  Publishers,	  2003.	  
	   58	  
	  Martin,	  Ian,	  Self-­‐Determination	  in	  East	  Timor,	  Boulder	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers	  Inc,	  2001.	  	  Martin,	  Ian	  and	  Mayer-­‐Rieckh,	  Alexander,	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  and	  East	  Timor:	  from	  self-­‐determination	  to	  state-­‐building’,	  International	  Peacekeeping,	  12:1,	  2005,	  pp.	  125-­‐145.	  	  Martinkus,	  John,	  A	  Dirty	  Little	  War,	  Milsons	  Point	  NSW:	  Random	  House	  Australia	  Pty	  Ltd,	  2001.	  	  	  McDonald,	  Hamish	  et	  al,	  Masters	  of	  Terror:	  Indonesia’s	  Military	  &	  Violence	  in	  East	  
Timor	  in	  1999,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Strategic	  and	  Defence	  Studies	  Centre,	  2002.	  	  Nevins,	  Joseph,	  A	  Not-­‐So-­‐Distant	  Horror:	  Mass	  Violence	  in	  East	  Timor,	  Ithaca	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  	  Nevins,	  Joseph,	  ‘The	  Making	  of	  “Ground	  Zero”	  in	  East	  Timor	  in	  1999:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  International	  Complicity	  in	  Indonesia’s	  Crimes’,	  Asian	  Survey,	  42:4,	  2002,	  pp.	  623-­‐641.	  	  Nicol,	  Bill,	  Timor:	  A	  Nation	  Reborn,	  Jakarta:	  Equinox	  Publishing,	  2002.	  	  Reeve,	  David,	  ‘Strange,	  Suspicious	  Packages’,	  in	  John	  Monfries	  (ed),	  Different	  
Societies,	  Shared	  Futures:	  Australia,	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Region,	  Singapore:	  ISEAS	  Publications,	  2006,	  pp.	  69-­‐83.	  	  Robinson,	  Geoffrey,	  East	  Timor	  1999:	  Crimes	  Against	  Humanity:	  A	  Report	  
Commissioned	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  
Rights	  (OHCHR),	  Dili:	  HAK	  Association	  &	  ELSAM,	  2006.	  	  	  	  Robinson,	  Geoffrey,	  “If	  You	  Leave	  Us	  Here,	  We	  Will	  Die”,	  New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  	  Robinson,	  Geoffrey,	  ‘With	  UNAMET	  in	  East	  Timor:	  A	  Historian’s	  Personal	  View’,	  
Bulletin	  of	  Concerned	  Asian	  Scholars,	  32:1-­‐2,	  2000,	  pp.	  23-­‐26.	  	  Samuel,	  Tamrat,	  ‘East	  Timor:	  the	  path	  to	  self-­‐determination’	  in	  Sriram,	  Chandra	  and	  Wermester,	  Karin	  (eds),	  From	  promise	  to	  practice:	  strengthening	  UN	  
capacities	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  violent	  conflict,	  Boulder	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2003.	  	  Shawcross,	  William,	  Deliver	  Us	  From	  Evil:	  Peacekeepers,	  Warlords	  and	  a	  World	  of	  
Endless	  Conflict,	  New	  York	  NY:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  2000.	  	  Singh,	  Bilveer,	  East	  Timor,	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  World	  –	  Myths	  and	  Realities,	  Kuala	  Lumpur:	  ADPR	  Consult	  (M)	  Sdn.	  Bhd,	  1996.	  	  
	   59	  
Singh,	  Bilveer,	  The	  United	  Nations’	  Role	  in	  the	  Birth	  of	  Independent	  East	  Timor	  –	  A	  
Blunder?,	  Singapore:	  Crescent	  Design	  Associates,	  1999.	  	  Smith,	  Michael	  and	  Dee,	  Moreen,	  Peacekeeping	  in	  East	  Timor,	  Boulder	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers	  Inc,	  2003.	  	  Suhrke,	  Astri,	  ‘Peacekeepers	  as	  Nation-­‐builders:	  Dilemmas	  of	  the	  UN	  in	  East	  Timor’,	  International	  Peacekeeping,	  8:4,	  Winter	  2001,	  pp.	  1-­‐20.	  	  Tanter,	  Richard	  and	  Selden,	  Mark	  and	  Shalom,	  Stephen	  (eds),	  Bitter	  Flowers,	  
Sweet	  Flowers	  –	  East	  Timor,	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  World	  Community,	  Annandale	  NSW:	  Pluto	  Press,	  2001.	  	  Taudevin,	  Lansell	  and	  Lee,	  Jefferson	  (eds),	  East	  Timor:	  Making	  Amends?	  
Analysing	  Australia’s	  role	  in	  reconstructing	  East	  Timor,	  Otford	  NSW:	  Otford	  Press,	  2000.	  	  Taudevin,	  Lansell,	  East	  Timor	  –	  Too	  Little	  Too	  Late,	  Potts	  Point	  NSW:	  Duffy	  &	  Snellgrove,	  1999.	  	  Taylor,	  John,	  East	  Timor:	  The	  Price	  of	  Freedom,	  Annandale	  NSW:	  Pluto	  Press	  Australia,	  1999.	  	  Thayer,	  Carl,	  ‘Australia-­‐Indonesia	  Relations:	  The	  Case	  of	  East	  Timor’,	  unpublished	  conference	  paper	  presented	  to	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Australia	  and	  East	  Asian	  Security	  into	  the	  21st	  Century,	  National	  Cheng	  Chi	  University,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan,	  8	  October	  1999,	  (copy	  in	  author’s	  possession).	  	  Tiffen,	  Rodney,	  Diplomatic	  Deceits	  –	  Government,	  Media	  and	  East	  Timor,	  Sydney	  NSW:	  UNSW	  Press,	  2001.	  	  Traub,	  James,	  ‘Inventing	  East	  Timor’,	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  79:4,	  2000,	  pp.	  74-­‐89.	  	  Wainwright,	  Elsina,	  Near	  Neighbour,	  New	  Challenge	  –	  Australia	  and	  the	  Security	  
of	  East	  Timor,	  Barton	  ACT:	  Australian	  Strategic	  Policy	  Institute,	  2002.	  	  Wheeler,	  Nicholas	  and	  Dunne,	  Tim,	  ‘East	  Timor	  and	  the	  New	  Humanitarian	  Interventionism’,	  International	  Affairs,	  77:4,	  October	  2001,	  pp.	  805-­‐827.	  	  White,	  Hugh,	  ‘The	  New	  Australia-­‐Indonesia	  Strategic	  Relationship:	  A	  Note	  of	  Caution’,	  in	  John	  Monfries	  (ed),	  Different	  Societies,	  Shared	  Futures:	  Australia,	  
Indonesia	  and	  the	  Region,	  Singapore:	  ISEAS	  Publications,	  2006,	  pp.	  41-­‐53.	  	  White,	  Hugh,	  ‘The	  Road	  to	  INTERFET:	  Reflections	  on	  Australian	  Strategic	  Decisions	  Concerning	  East	  Timor,	  December	  1998-­‐September	  1999’,	  Security	  
Challenges,	  4:1,	  Autumn	  2008,	  pp.	  69-­‐87.	  	  Woodard,	  Garry,	  ‘Australia’s	  Foreign	  Policy	  after	  Timor’,	  International	  Journal,	  55:1,	  Winter	  1999/2000,	  pp.	  1-­‐14.	  
	   60	  
Newspaper	  and	  periodical	  articles	  
	  N.B.	  	   Most	  newspaper	  articles	  listed	  below	  were	  sourced	  from	  the	  Factiva	  database.	  	  Articles	  from	  The	  Bulletin	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  print	  edition.	  
	  Aylmer,	  Sean,	  ‘Timor:	  Downer	  says	  there’s	  no	  rift	  with	  US’,	  The	  Australian	  
Financial	  Review,	  02	  August	  1999.	  	  Barker,	  Geoffrey,	  ‘Australia	  bends	  to	  people	  power’,	  The	  Australian	  Financial	  
Review,	  16	  May	  1998.	  	  Becker,	  Elizabeth,	  ‘U.S.	  and	  Indonesian	  Generals	  Discuss	  Safety	  of	  Troops	  in	  Timor’,	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  16	  September	  1999.	  	  Daley,	  Paul,	  ‘Downer	  Trips	  Over	  Secret	  Timor	  Cable’,	  The	  Age,	  11	  August	  1999.	  	  Daley,	  Paul,	  ‘Gunning	  for	  the	  General’,	  The	  Bulletin,	  06	  July	  2004.	  	  Daley,	  Paul,	  ‘Timor:	  envoy	  claims	  US	  kept	  in	  dark’,	  The	  Bulletin,	  04	  May	  2004.	  	  Daley,	  Paul,	  ‘US	  Marines	  Set	  For	  Dili’,	  The	  Age,	  10	  August	  1999.	  	  Dodson,	  Louise,	  ‘Brereton	  promises	  improved	  relations	  with	  European	  Union’,	  
The	  Australian	  Financial	  Review,	  23	  January	  1998.	  	  Dow	  Jones	  Newswires,	  ‘Australia	  Urges	  Indonesia	  Habibie	  to	  End	  East	  Timor	  Dispute’,	  25	  May	  1998.	  	  Garran,	  Robert,	  ‘US	  should	  repay	  loyalty’,	  The	  Australian,	  08	  September	  1999.	  	  Greene,	  Gervase,	  ‘Howard	  in	  Freedom	  Call	  on	  East	  Timor’,	  The	  Age,	  26	  May	  1998.	  	  Greenlees,	  Donald,	  ‘Amnesty	  not	  enough	  for	  Dili’,	  The	  Australian,	  11	  June	  1998.	  	  Greenlees,	  Don,	  ‘E	  Timor	  –	  divide	  and	  conquer’,	  The	  Australian,	  06	  February	  1999.	  	  Greenlees,	  Don	  and	  McGregor,	  Richard,	  ‘Howard	  Reverse	  on	  Timor’,	  The	  
Australian,	  12	  January	  1999.	  	  Johnstone,	  Craig	  and	  Spencer,	  Stephen,	  ‘Howard	  pledges	  police	  for	  Timor’,	  The	  
Courier-­‐Mail,	  28	  April	  1999.	  	  Kelly,	  Paul,	  ‘John	  Howard's	  covert	  East	  Timor	  independence	  plan’,	  The	  
Australian,	  05	  September	  2009.	  	  Lyons,	  John,	  ‘Murder,	  madness	  and	  miscalculation’,	  The	  Bulletin,	  21	  September	  1999.	  	  
	   61	  
Lyons,	  John,	  ‘The	  Secret	  Timor	  Dossier’,	  The	  Bulletin,	  12	  October	  1999.	  	  Maher,	  Michael,	  ‘Back	  from	  the	  brink’,	  The	  Bulletin,	  21	  September	  1999.	  
	  Murdoch,	  Lindsay,	  ‘Australia	  in	  Secret	  E	  Timor	  Peace	  Role’,	  The	  Age,	  18	  July	  1998.	  	  Murdoch,	  Lindsay,	  ‘We’re	  Neutral	  on	  Timor:	  Downer’,	  The	  Sun-­‐Herald,	  01	  August	  1999.	  
	  Oakes,	  Laurie,	  ‘Canberra’s	  massacre	  we	  had	  to	  have’,	  The	  Bulletin,	  21	  September	  1999.	  	  Reuters	  News,	  ‘Indonesia’s	  Habibie	  says	  no	  change	  in	  Timor	  policy’,	  02	  June	  1998.	  	  Schwartz,	  Eric,	  ‘A	  Reminder	  That	  Friends	  In	  Deed	  Are	  Friends	  Indeed’,	  The	  
Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  24	  July	  2001.	  	  Shenon,	  Philip,	  ‘President	  Asserts	  Jakarta	  Must	  Act	  or	  Admit	  Troops’,	  The	  New	  
York	  Times,	  10	  September	  1999.	  	  Steketee,	  Mike,	  ‘Canberra	  accused	  of	  shirking	  E	  Timor’,	  The	  Australian,	  01	  October	  1997.	  	  Stille,	  Alexander,	  ‘Prospecting	  for	  Truth	  in	  the	  Ore	  of	  Memory’,	  The	  New	  York	  
Times,	  10	  March	  2001.	  	  	  	  Williams,	  Louise,	  ‘Military	  Ties	  Help,	  Downer	  Insists’,	  The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  10	  July	  1998.	  	  Williams,	  Louise,	  ‘Downer	  Concerned	  At	  Timor	  Moves’,	  The	  Age,	  19	  October	  1998.	  	  Wright,	  Lincoln,	  ‘US	  Adviser	  Apologises	  For	  “stupid	  Metaphor”,	  Canberra	  Times,	  20	  September	  1999.	  	  
Australian	  Government	  publications	  Australian	  National	  Audit	  Office,	  Management	  of	  Australian	  Defence	  Force	  
Deployments	  to	  East	  Timor,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Australian	  National	  Audit	  Office,	  2002.	  	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  Australia’s	  Strategic	  Policy,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Department	  of	  Defence,	  1997.	  	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  East	  Timor	  –	  Final	  Report	  of	  the	  Senate	  Foreign	  
Affairs,	  Defence	  and	  Trade	  References	  Committee,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Senate	  Printing	  Unit,	  2000.	  	  
	   62	  
Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  East	  Timor	  in	  Transition	  1998-­‐2000:	  An	  Australian	  
Policy	  Challenge,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  2001.	  	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  Interim	  Report	  on	  East	  Timor,	  the	  Senate	  Foreign	  
Affairs,	  Defence	  and	  Trade	  References	  Committee,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Senate	  Printing	  Unit,	  1999.	  	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  Near	  Neighbours	  -­‐	  Good	  Neighbours:	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  
Australia’s	  Relationship	  with	  Indonesia,	  Canberra	  ACT:	  Parliament	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  2004.	  	  
Media	  releases,	  press	  conferences	  and	  news	  advisories	  	  Cohen,	  William,	  News	  Advisories,	  at	  http://tinyurl.com/cohenarchive	  [accessed	  11	  June	  2012].	  	  Cohen,	  William	  and	  Moore,	  John,	  Joint	  Press	  Briefing,	  29	  September	  1999.	  	  Downer,	  Alexander,	  Media	  Release	  –	  Australian	  Government	  Historic	  Policy	  Shift	  
on	  East	  Timor,	  12	  January	  1999.	  	  Downer,	  Alexander,	  Media	  Release	  –	  Visit	  to	  Jakarta,	  Indonesia,	  30	  June	  1998.	  	  
United	  Nations	  Publications	  
	  
• SG/SM/6922	  of	  12	  March	  1999	  –	  Press	  Release.	  
• S/1999/705	  of	  22	  June	  1999	  –	  Question	  of	  East	  Timor,	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  
• S/1999/786	  of	  14	  July	  1999	  –	  Letter	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  Addressed	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  
• S/1999/803	  of	  20	  July	  1999	  –	  Question	  of	  East	  Timor,	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  
• S/1999/944	  of	  03	  September	  1999	  –	  Letter	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  Addressed	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  
• S/1999/976	  of	  14	  September	  1999	  –	  Report	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  Mission	  to	  Jakarta	  and	  Dili,	  8	  to	  12	  September	  1999.	  
• S/RES/1264	  (1999)	  –	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1264	  	  
Records	  from	  the	  Australian	  Parliament	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Hansard,	  11	  March	  1999.	  	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  Official	  Committee	  Hansard,	  References	  Committee:	  Economic,	  social	  and	  political	  conditions	  in	  East	  Timor.	  	  	  
• 13	  August	  1999	  
• 20	  September	  1999	  
• 24	  September	  1999	  
• 11	  November	  1999	  
• 18	  November	  1999	  
	   63	  
• 06	  December	  1999	  
• 09	  December	  1999	  
• 10	  April	  2000	  	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  Official	  Committee	  Hansard,	  Consideration	  of	  Additional	  Estimates,	  Senate	  committee	  on	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Defence	  and	  Trade	  Legislation.	  
• 11	  February	  1999	  	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  Official	  Committee	  Hansard,	  Consideration	  of	  Budget	  Estimates,	  Senate	  committee	  on	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Defence	  and	  Trade	  Legislation.	  
• 08	  June	  1999	  
• 02	  December	  1999	  
	  
Records	  from	  the	  Congress	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  United	  States	  of	  America	  Congress,	  ‘Challenges	  in	  US-­‐Asian	  policy	  :	  hearing	  before	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  Asia	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  International	  Relations,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  one	  hundred	  and	  sixth	  Congress,	  first	  session,	  10	  February	  1999.	  	  United	  States	  of	  America	  Congress,	  ‘United	  States	  policy	  toward	  Indonesia’,	  hearing	  before	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  the	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  International	  Relations,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  one	  hundred	  and	  fifth	  Congress,	  first	  session,	  07	  May	  1997	  	  United	  States	  of	  America	  Congress,	  ‘U.S.	  policy	  options	  toward	  Indonesia:	  what	  we	  can	  expect;	  what	  we	  can	  do’,	  hearing	  before	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  International	  Relations,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  one	  hundred	  and	  fifth	  Congress,	  second	  session,	  04	  June	  1998.	  	  United	  States	  of	  America	  Congress,	  ‘U.S.	  interests	  at	  the	  June	  U.S.-­‐China	  summit’,	  hearing	  before	  the	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  United	  States	  Senate,	  one	  hundred	  and	  fifth	  Congress,	  second	  session,	  14	  May	  1998.	  	  United	  States	  of	  America	  Congress,	  ‘Indonesia:	  countdown	  to	  elections’,	  hearing	  before	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  East	  Asian	  and	  Pacific	  Affair	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  United	  States	  Senate,	  one	  hundred	  and	  sixth	  Congress,	  first	  session,	  18	  March	  1998.	  	  United	  States	  of	  America	  Congress,	  ‘The	  political	  futures	  of	  Indonesia	  and	  East	  Timor’,	  joint	  hearing	  before	  the	  subcommittee	  on	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific	  of	  the	  committee	  on	  international	  relations,	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  and	  the	  subcommittee	  on	  East	  Asian	  and	  Pacific	  Affairs	  of	  the	  committee	  on	  foreign	  relations,	  United	  States	  Senate,	  one	  hundred	  and	  sixth	  Congress,	  first	  session,	  09	  September	  1999.	  
	   	  
	   64	  
	  
Multimedia	  	  Australian	  Broadcasting	  Corporation,	  ‘The	  Ties	  that	  Bind’,	  Four	  Corners	  (television	  program),	  14	  February	  2000.	  	  Australian	  Broadcasting	  Corporation,	  ‘Defence	  Intelligence’,	  The	  National	  Interest	  (radio	  program),	  31	  October	  1999,	  at	  
http://tinyurl.com/defenceintelligence,	  [accessed	  31	  December	  2011].	  	  Australian	  Broadcasting	  Corporation,	  The	  Howard	  Years	  (television	  series),	  2008.	  
